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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SACRIFICING THE GOOD OF THE 
FEW FOR THE GOOD OF THE MANY: DENYING THE TERMINALLY 
ILL ACCESS TO EXPERIMENTAL MEDICATION 
INTRODUCTION 
In January of 2008, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on a 
case that began with the death of a twenty-one year old woman 
named Abigail Burroughs.1 In 2001, Abigail lost a two-year fight 
with squamous cell carcinoma, a type of non-melanoma skin can­
cer.2 Squamous cell carcinoma is the second most common form of 
skin cancer3-it is estimated to occur domestically in two- to three­
hundred thousand people each year.4 The American Cancer Soci­
ety estimates that one- to two-thousand people die each year from 
skin cancers other than melanoma, including squamous cell carci­
noma.s This type of cancer is usually very treatable,6 but life threat­
ening when it spreads to a person's organs.7 
During her treatment, Abigail and her family learned of Er­
bitux, an experimental cancer drug that demonstrated promising re­
sults during early trials.8 At the time, Erbitux was in the clinical 
1. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es­
chenbach, (Abigail Alliance II), 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 
128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008); Linda Greenhouse, Justices Won't Hear Appeal on Drugs for 
Terminally Ill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,2008, at A15. 
2. Sue Kovach, The Abigail Alliance: Motivated by Tragic Circumstances, Families 
Battle an Uncaring Bureaucracy, LIFE EXTENSION, Sept. 2007, at 25, 25-26; see also 
Mark Thornton, Editorial, The Clinical Trial, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12,2007, at A14 (noting 
the death of Abigail Burroughs due to "a rare form of cancer"). 
3. Skin Cancer Foundation, Squamous Cell Carcinoma, http://www.skincancer. 
org/contentlview/23/81 (last visited Apr. 15, 2009). 
4. American Cancer Society, What are the Key Statistics About Squamous and 
Basal Cell Skin Cancer?, http://www.cancer.org/docrootlCRIIcontent/CRC2_4_1X_ 
What_are_the_key_statistics_for_skin3ancer_51.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2009); see 
also Skin Cancer Foundation, supra note 3 (noting that there are "over 250,000 new 
cases per year estimated in the United States"). 
5. See American Cancer Society, supra note 4 (noting that the number of people 
who die from squamous cell skin cancer each year is unknown). 
6. AM. CANCER SOC'y, CANCER FACTS & FIGURES 2008, at 19 (2008), http:// 
www.cancer.org/downloads/STT/2008CAFFfinalsecured.pdf (characterizing most forms 
of squamous cell carcinoma as "highly curable"). 
7. Skin Cancer Foundation, supra note 3. 
8. Kovach, supra note 2, at 26; see also Complaint at 7, Abigail Alliance for Bet­
ter Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan, No. 03-1601, 2004 WL 3777340 
535 

536 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:535 
trial phase of the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) evalua­
tion process for new drugs.9 Abigail was not eligible to participate 
in the clinical trial,10 and the manufacturer was unwilling to provide 
it under the FDA's treatment-use exception.ll Abigail spent the 
last seven months of her life trying to gain access to Erbitux in the 
hope that the drug could prolong her life.12 
In February, 2004, Erbitux was approved "to treat patients 
with advanced colorectal cancer that has spread to other parts of 
(D.D.C. Aug. 30,2004), rev'd sub nom. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Develop­
mental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en bane, 495 
F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008); FDA Extends Indications 
for Erbitux, 25 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 291, 291 (2006) (reporting that the use of 
Erbitux in clinical trials, along with radiation, "extended patient survival by more than 
[twenty] months"); Editorial, Drug Reckoning, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2006, at A14 (not­
ing that, as early as 2000, an FDA medical reviewer acknowledged there was "ex­
tremely compelling" evidence for use of Erbitux in head and neck cancer); Judy 
Foreman, For Some, Untested Drug Is a Last Chance, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 23, 2003, at 
C3 (observing that Iressa, a drug similar to Erbitux, was approved by the FDA in May 
2003). 
9. Press Release, ImClone Sys. Inc., Data Presented on Anti-Tumor Activity of 
Erbitux (Cetuximab) as a Single-Agent and in Combination with Widely-Used Three­
Drug Chemotherapy in Colorectal Carcinoma (May 19, 2002), http://phx.corporate-ir. 
netlphoenix.zhtml?c=97689&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=569027&highlight= (indicating 
results from a Phase II clinical trial designed to study the effects of Erbitux on 
colorectal cancer); see also Peter M. Currie, Note, Restricting Access to Unapproved 
Drugs: A Compelling Government Interest?, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 309, 313 (2007) (describ­
ing the clinical trial process). 
10. Kovach, supra note 2, at 26. During Abigail's illness, the clinical trials for 
Erbitux were being conducted to study its effectiveness for colorectal cancer. Id. Abi­
gail Burroughs was ineligible for these trials because she was suffering from head and 
neck cancer. After Abigail had already died, further clinical trials studied the effects of 
Erbitux in head and neck cancer. Id. at 27; see also Complaint, supra note 8, at 7 
(recounting the clinical trials on the type of cancer that killed Abigail Burroughs); Fore­
man, supra note 8 (noting that Abigail Burroughs was denied access to an experimental 
cancer drug under a treatment use program because she "had the wrong kind of 
cancer"). 
11. See Complaint, supra note 8, at 6 ("Existing 'compassionate use' programs for 
new drugs, under which drug companies may opt voluntarily to provide drugs to a lim­
ited number of patients during [the] pre-approval period, accommodate only a small 
number of patients ... because drug sponsors may not charge more than a cost recovery 
amount to participants."); PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECrING AMERICA'S HEALTH: THE 
FDA, BUSINESS, AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION 244 (2003) (noting that 
patients in clinical trials need to be "relatively similar in age, background, and state of 
disease" in order to be sure "that any result could be clearly attributed to the drug"); 
see infra discussion Part l.A.2 for more information on early access exceptions. 
12. Kovach, supra note 2, at 26; see also Andrew Pollack, Court Rejects Patient 
Right to Use Drugs Being Tested, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2007, at A12 ("Abigail [Bur­
roughs] died from cancer after a long battle to receive treatment with experimental 
drugs that were eventually approved."). 
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the body."13 Two years later, in 2006, the FDA also approved the 
use of Erbitux for the treatment of advanced squamous cell carci­
noma-the same type of cancer that killed Abigail Burroughs five 
years earlier.14 Because of the widely established practice of pre­
scribing drugs off-label, a patient with squamous cell carcinoma 
could likely have been able to receive this potentially lifesaving 
drug as early as 2004.15 The clinical studies of Erbitux have shown 
that the drug can lower the risk of disease progression and reduce 
the possibility of death in patients who receive the drug as part of a 
treatment program that also includes radiotherapy.16 
The Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental 
Drugs, founded shortly after her death by her father, Frank Bur­
roughs, is a non-profit group that advocates for patients diagnosed 
with life-threatening illnessesY Its members seek increased access 
13. Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Approves Erbitux for 
Colorectal Cancer (Feb. 12, 2004), http://www.fda.govlbbs/topicsINEWS/2004INEW 
0l024.html; see also FDA Extends Indications for Erbitux, supra note 8, at 291 (report­
ing that the FDA approved Erbitux in 2004 for the treatment of colorectal cancer); 
Editorial, Erbitux for Americans Too, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2003, at A16 (noting that in 
2003, Switzerland was the first country to approve the sale of Erbitux). 
14. See FDA Extends Indications for Erbitux, supra note 8, at 291; see also U.S. 
Food and Drug Admin., Erbitux (cetuximab) Approved for Use in Combination with 
Radiation Therapy, http://www.fda.gov/cder/Offices/OODP/whatsnew/cetuximab.htm 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (noting that Erbitux was approved for use in squamous cell 
cancers of the head and neck in 2006). 
15. See David G. Adams, The Food and Drug Administration's Regulation of 
Health Care Professionals, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION 423, 425 
(David G. Adams, Richard M. Cooper & Jonathan S. Kahan eds., 1997) (noting that the 
"off-label use of approved drugs" is the most notable practice "not subject to regulation 
under the FDCA"); Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of 
FDA-Approved Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. 
REV. 181, 186-87 (1999); Richard Miller, Editorial, "Choice" in Health Care, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 27, 2007, at A17 (discussing "off-label use of cancer drugs"). A drug prescribed 
for a use other than the one for which it was approved is prescribed off label. Salbu, 
supra at 188. Drugs may only be marketed for the specific diseases for which they have 
been approved, but doctors are not similarly regulated by the FDA. Id. at 189. In fact, 
once a drug is approved for use by the FDA, a doctor can prescribe it to a patient for 
any use. Id. at 188. 
16. James A. Bonner et aI., Radiotherapy Plus Cetuximab for Squamous-Cell Car­
cinoma of the Head and Neck, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 567, 572 (2006); see also Marshall 
R. Posner & Lori J. Worth, Cetuximab and Radiotherapy for Head and Neck Cancer, 
354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 634 (2006) (noting the "unquestionable improvement in locore­
gional control, progression-free survival, and overall survival among patients treated 
with cetuximab plus radiotherapy"); Drug Reckoning, supra note 8 (reporting that Er­
bitux tests indicated an increased survival rate of twenty months in cancer patients). 
17. Kovach, supra note 2, at 30; see also Editorial, If All Else Fails, Let the Dying 
Try Unapproved Drugs, USA TODAY, Aug. 21, 2007, at lOA [hereinafter If All Else 
Fails ]. 
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and early-use programs for experimental cancer drugs for patients 
who have exhausted other available treatment options.18 In pursuit 
of this objective, the Alliance submitted a petition to the FDA seek­
ing to amend certain FDA regulations.19 The proposed changes, 
which were not enacted by the FDA, would have simplified the pro­
cess for terminally ill patients to access experimental drugs.20 
When the FDA failed to respond favorably to the petition, the Alli­
ance brought its argument to the federal courtS.21 
Part I of this Note will discuss how new "experimental" drugs 
gain FDA approval, including an overview of the clinical trial pro­
cess and one of the methods of early access. Part I will also discuss 
the history of the major drug regulations enacted in the United 
States, both decisions issued by the court of appeals in the two Abi­
gail Alliance cases, as well as the process used by courts to analyze 
fundamental rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Part II will analyze how the asserted right was 
framed in both appellate decisions, the historical inaccuracies that 
18. The Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, The Abigail 
Alliance Mission, http://abigail-alliance.org/mission.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2009); see 
also Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 
(Abigail Alliance II), 495 F.3d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en bane), cert. denied, 128 S. 
Ct. 1069 (2008); Foreman, supra note 8 (noting that the Abigail Alliance is seeking 
changes to FDA regulations that would allow terminally ill patients to have wider ac­
cess to experimental drugs). 
19. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 699; see also Citizen Petition, 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 
(2008) (describing the requirements for the submission of a citizen petition to the FDA 
to seek alterations to existing regulations); FDA Treatment Use of an Investigational 
New Drug, 21 c.F.R. § 312.34 (describing the treatment-use exception to the clinical 
trial phase, which the Alliance sought to amend to ease the process for terminally ill 
patients to gain access to experimental drugs); Citizen Petition of the Abigail Alliance 
& the Washington Legal Found. to the Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs. (June 11, 2003), http://abigail-alliance.orglWLF_FDA.pdf [hereinafter 
Citizen Petition] (detailing the changes that the Alliance was seeking to make to 21 
C.F.R. § 312.34); see infra Part I. A.1-2 for information regarding the approval process 
for new drugs and for treatment Investigational New Drugs (IND). 
20. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 699-700; see also Citizen Petition, supra note 
19; Foreman, supra note 8 (noting that the Alliance was seeking a new level of ap­
proval-"Tier 1 Initial Approval"-to allow access to experimental drugs that had suc­
cessfully completed the first phase of the clinical trial process); infra notes 53 and 63 for 
information regarding the Alliance's proposed changes to the FDA regulations gov­
erning access to experimental drugs. 
21. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan, No. 
03-1601,2004 WL 3777340 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004), rev'd sub nom. Abigail Alliance for 
Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 
2006), vacated en bane, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), eert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 
(2008). 
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the en banc court relied on to support its decision, and alternative 
considerations that failed to capture that court's attention. 
The ultimate conclusion of this Note is that the initial appellate 
decision22 took the proper approach to the issues presented by the 
Alliance. Both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment and Supreme Court precedent support the right for mentally 
competent, terminally ill patients, with no other viable means of 
treatment, to make reasoned and informed decisions regarding 
their own treatment. If an individual elects to attempt to prolong 
his life by undergoing treatment with experimental medications, the 
FDA should not impose a barrier to access simply because it has 
not conclusively determined the safety and efficacy of the 
medication. 
I. THE UNDERLYING ISSUES 
A. FDA New Drug Approval Process and Treatment Exception 
1. New Drug Approval Process 
Access to experimental drugs is governed by the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),23 which blocks access to all drugs 
before they have been approved by the FDA.24 The FDA's ap­
proval process requires "substantial evidence"25 that the drug will 
achieve the effects claimed under its prescribed uses before it can 
22. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es­
chenbach (Abigail Alliance I), 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en bane, 495 F.3d 
695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). 
23. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.c. §§ 301-392 (2000). 
24. Abigail Alliance l/, 495 F.3d at 697; see also 21 U.S.c. § 355(a) ("No person 
shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any new drug, un­
less an approval of an application ... is effective with respect to such drug."); Steven 
Goldberg, Technology Unbound: Will Funded Libertarianism Dominate the Future?, 18 
STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 21, 23 (2007) ("A new drug cannot be marketed until the FDA 
determines it is safe and effective."). 
25. 21 U.S.c. § 355(d)(5). See generally, Geoffrey M. Levitt, James N. Czaban & 
Andrea S. Paterson, Human Drug Regulation, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REG­
ULATION, supra note 15, at 159-204 (providing a broad overview of the FDA's drug 
review process). 
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be sold by manufacturers to the public.26 This evidence is gathered 
during a lengthy clinical trial process with human subjects.27 
Before clinical trials begin on humans, drug companies usually 
test on laboratory animals to gain an understanding of the drug's 
effect and potential toxicity.28 Following this research, if the drug is 
sufficiently promising, the manufacturer will submit an Investiga­
tional New Drug (IND) application to the FDA to begin clinical 
testing on humans.29 After submitting this application, the manu­
facturer begins the clinical trial process, which is controlled by FDA 
regulations and requires three phases of clinical trials.30 During 
these phases, researchers gradually increase the number of humans 
taking the experimental medication while gathering data concern­
ing the safety and efficacy of the medication.3l Phase I focuses pri­
marily on the safety of the drug and its side effects.32 Phases II and 
26. See 21 U.S.C § 355(a); see also Alissa Puckett, Comment, The Proper Focus 
for FDA Regulations: Why the Fundamental Right to Self-Preservation Should Allow 
Terminally III Patients with No Treatment Options to Attempt to Save Their Lives, 60 
SMU L. REV. 635, 642 (2007) (discussing the FDCA's prohibition of market access for 
new drugs prior to FDA approval). 
27. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 697; see Phases of an Investigation, 21 CF.R. 
§ 312.21 (2008) (describing three phases that investigational new drugs undergo prior to 
approval by the FDA). 
28. Beth E. Meyers, Note, The Food and Drug Administration·s Experimental 
Drug Approval System: Is it Good for Your Health?, 28 Hous. L. REV. 309, 313 (1991); 
see also 21 U.S.C § 355(b)(1) (outlining evidentiary requirements necessary for filing 
an application for a new drug with the FDA); Puckett, supra note 26, at 643 ("[F]our 
levels of testing [are] required before new drugs can receive approval to be marketed in 
the United States: one on animals and three on humans."). 
29. Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, 21 CF.R. § 312 (2008); see Re­
quirement for an IND, 21 C.F.R. § 312.20; General Requirements for Use of an Investi­
gational New Drug in a Clinical Investigation, 21 CF.R. § 312.40; see also HILTS, supra 
note 10, at 168 (noting that the submission of the IND "announce[s] a company's inten­
tion to begin human experiments with a new drug"); Meyers, supra note 28, at 313-14 
(explaining IND application process); Puckett, supra note 26, at 643 (observing that the 
results of animal testing will influence the manufacturer's decision to submit a request 
to the FDA for further approval). 
30. 21 CF.R. § 312.21. 
31. [d.; see also Meyers, supra note 28, at 313-14 (explaining clinical trial and 
human testing of experimental drugs); Puckett, supra note 26, at 643 (noting the num­
ber of patients usually involved in each stage of the clinical trial process); Johns Hop­
kins Kimmel Cancer Center, About Cancer Clinical Trials, http://www.hopkinskimmel 
cancercenter.orglindex.cfm/cID/240 (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (describing the clinical 
trial process and the objectives of the individual phases of the trials). 
32. 21 CF.R. § 312.21(a)(1)-(2) provides: 
(a) Phase I. 
(1) Phase 1 includes the initial introduction of an investigational new 
drug into humans. Phase 1 studies are typically closely monitored and may be 
conducted in patients or normal volunteer subjects. These studies are designed 
to determine the metabolism and pharmacologic actions of the drug in humans, 
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III are designed to gather information on the drug's safety and ef­
fectiveness for treating a particular disease.33 Progression through 
these phases can be a lengthy process, often taking SIX or more 
years to complete.34 
the side effects associated with increasing doses, and, if possible, to gain early 
evidence on effectiveness. During Phase 1, sufficient information about the 
drug's pharmacokinetics and pharmacological effects should be obtained to 
permit the design of well-controlled, scientifically valid, Phase 2 studies. The 
total number ofsubjects and patients included in Phase 1 studies varies with the 
drug, but is generally in the range of 20 to 80. 
(2) Phase 1 studies also include studies of drug metabolism, structure­
activity relationships, and mechanism of action in humans, as well as studies in 
which investigational drugs are used as research tools to explore biological 
phenomena or disease processes. 
[d. (emphasis added); see also Foreman, supra note 8 (noting that Phase I of the clinical 
trial process is the "safety trial," and a drug in Phase I may only be tested on several 
dozen patients). 
33. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b)·(c) provides: 
(b) Phase 2. Phase 2 includes the controlled clinical studies conducted to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the drug for a particular indication or indications in 
patients with the disease or condition under study and to determine the com­
mon short-term side effects and risks associated with the drug. Phase 2 studies 
are typically well controlled, closely monitored, and conducted in a relatively 
small number of patients, usually involving no more than several hundred 
subjects. 
(c) Phase 3. Phase 3 studies are expanded controlled and uncontrolled 
trials. They are performed after preliminary evidence suggesting effectiveness 
of the drug has been obtained, and are intended to gather the additional infor­
mation about effectiveness and safety that is needed to evaluate the overall bene­
fit-risk relationship of the drug and to provide an adequate basis for physician 
labeling. Phase 3 studies usually include from several hundred to several thou­
sand subjects. 
[d. (emphasis added); see also Foreman, supra note 8 (noting that Phases II and III of 
the clinical trial process test the effectiveness and potential dosages of experimental 
drugs). 
34. Elizabeth M. Rutherford, The FDA and "Privatization "-The Drug Approval 
Process, 50 FOOD & DRUG LJ. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 203, 213 (1995); see also Geoffrey M. 
Levitt, James N. Czaban & Andrea S. Paterson, Human Drug Regulation, in 2 FUNDA­
MENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 15, at 172 ("The length of FDA review 
times on [new drug applications] has been a major source of frustration over the years 
for both the agency and the drug industry."); Mary M. Dunbar, Shaking Up the Status 
Quo: How AIDS Activists Have Challenged Drug Development and Approval Proce­
dures, 46 FOOD DRUG COSMo L.J. 673, 682 (1991) (stating that the approval process for 
a new drug "can take six years or longer"); A.W. Harris, Derogating the Precautionary 
Principle, 19 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1,71 (2008) ("Perhaps the most prominent example of 
the harm caused by excessive 'precaution' in regulatory policy is FDA-induced 'drug 
lag.' The FDA must approve new pharmaceuticals and medical devices before they 
may be used or prescribed in the United States. The purpose of FDA approval is to 
ensure that only those drugs deemed 'safe and effective' are approved for use. In a 
precautionary fashion, the FDA seeks to prevent the release of an unsafe drug. Delay­
ing the availability of potentially life-saving treatment, however, poses risks of its own. 
Consider the question posed by one prominent FDA critic: 'If a drug that has just been 
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Following the clinical trial phase of this process, the drug man­
ufacturer submits a New Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA for 
approval of the new drug.35 This application must be approved by 
the FDA in order for the manufacturer to market the drug.36 
Under the FDCA, the FDA has 180 days to respond to the applica­
tion;37 however, in reality, the approval process can take as long as 
thirty months.38 If the application fails to meet one of the statutory 
requirements it will be denied by the FDA.39 
2. Clinical Trials and Early Access 
Experimental drugs are not generally available to the public 
during the clinical trial process.40 There are, however, two ways 
that a patient can gain access to experimental drugs during the 
clinical trial phase.41 First, if a patient meets the specific require-
approved by FDA will start saving lives tomorrow, then how many people died yester­
day waiting for the agency to act?'" (quoting Jonathan H. Adler, More Sorry than Safe: 
Assessing the Precautionary Principle and the Proposed International Biosafety Proto­
col, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 173, 195 (2000))); Brian Christopher Moody, Prescription Medi­
cation and Consumer Protection: A Time for Reform, 5 J. PHARMACY & L. 19, 19 (1996) 
(estimating that it takes ten to twelve years of development for a drug to reach the 
market); Puckett, supra note 26, at 643 ("[C]ompleting all phases of the required 
clinical trials takes a minimum of seven years."); Foreman, supra note 8 (estimating that 
it can take up to ten years and $800 million, on average, for experimental drugs to gain 
approval); Thornton, supra note 2 (noting that clinical testing and FDA approval can 
take up to seven years). 
35. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938,21 U.S.c. § 355(a) (2000); 
see also 21 c.F.R. § 314.50 (outlining the requirements that the application must meet 
for FDA consideration); HILTS, supra note 10, at 168 ("The NDA is a company's appli­
cation for final approval and marketing of a drug after animal and human tests have 
been conducted. These applications should contain the most conclusive data proving a 
new drug is safe and effective. "). 
36. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a). 
37. Id. § 355(c)(1). 
38. See Rutherford, supra note 34, at 213 ("The FDA averages thirty months to 
review [New Drug Applications], despite the fact that the statutory review limit is six 
months."); Stephen R. Kovatis, Note, The Right to Live: Do the Terminally III Have a 
Constitutional Right to Use Experimental Drugs?, 26 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVfL. L. 
149, 152-53 (2007) (stating that it takes six years to complete the clinical trials and an 
average of thirty months for FDA approval following those trials). 
39. See 21 U.S.c. § 355(d); see also Foreman, supra note 8 (noting that eighty 
percent of experimental drugs will not make it through final FDA approval); Ruther­
ford, supra note 34, at 213 ("[O]ne in five compounds ... tested in humans ... receive 
FDA approval."). 
40. See 21 U.S.c. § 355. 
41. Phases of an Investigation, 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2008) (clinical trial process); 
Treatment Use of an Investigational New Drug, 21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (treatment IND); 
see also Foreman, supra note 8 (noting that a patient can gain access to an experimental 
drug by enrolling in a clinical trial or by requesting access from the manufacturer under 
a treatment use program). 
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ments of the drug manufacturer's clinical trial, she may be able to 
receive the drug as a participant in the trial process.42 Clinical trials 
have a limited number of spaces available and gaining access can be 
difficult because trials are strictly controlled and, in addition to nu­
merous other requirements, mandate that subjects be in certain 
stages of a disease.43 
The second means of early access is an FDA exception that 
allows patients outside the clinical trial process to access the drug.44 
This exception, known as a "treatment IND," was introduced in 
1987.45 The exception provides access to "drug[s] that [are] not ap­
proved for marketing," but are under "clinical investigation."46 The 
goal of the exception is to provide potentially lifesaving experimen­
tal drugs to needy patients as early as possible.47 
42. 21 c.F.R. § 312.21. However, even enrollment in a clinical trial does not 
guarantee that an individual will receive the experimental drug. See Goldberg, supra 
note 24, at 23 ("An individual who might benefit from a drug under study might not be 
chosen for the clinical trials and, in any event, might receive a placebo in those trials. "); 
ClinicaITrials.gov, http://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (providing a 
searchable database of clinical trials). 
43. Meyers, supra note 28, at 310 (noting that locations for clinical trials may be 
far from where a willing participant is located); see also Puckett, supra note 26, at 643 
("[D)rug companies require a patient to be in a certain stage of the disease, at least 
eighteen years of age, and, in some cases, to not have taken certain drugs or treat­
ments."); If All Else Fails, supra note 17 (noting that clinical trials "have strict parame­
ters.... [and) [o)nly a small percentage of applicants" qualify if they have the same 
disease the experimental drug is being tested for). 
44. 21 c.F.R. § 312.34. This exception is by no means the only program operated 
by the FDA that allows early access to experimental drugs. However, this Note focuses 
solely on the treatment IND exception because it is representative of the other FDA 
exceptions and because this is the exception that the Abigail Alliance sought to amend 
in its Citizen Petition. See Citizen Petition, supra note 19. 
45. Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regula­
tions; Treatment Use and Sale, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,466 (May 22, 1987) (codified at 21 
C.F.R. § 312); see also Rita Rubin, Unapproved Drugs Ignite Life-and-Death Debate; 
Lawsuit Pits Desperately III Against Hard Bureaucratic Realities, USA TODAY, Apr. 2, 
2007, lA (noting that the process of granting access to pre-approved drugs-"compas­
sionate use"-has its foundation in successful efforts by AIDS activists in the 1980s). 
46. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(a). This section provides: 
(a) General. A drug that is not approved for marketing may be under 
clinical investigation for a serious or immediately life-threatening disease condi­
tion in patients for whom no comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or 
other therapy is available. During the clinical investigation of the drug, it may 
be appropriate to use the drug in the treatment of patients not in the clinical 
trials, in accordance with a treatment protocol or treatment IND. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
47. [d.; see also Geoffrey M. Levitt, James N. Czaban & Andrea S. Paterson, 
Human Drug Regulation, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 
15, at 199 (noting that the treatment IND exception allows use of experimental drugs 
outside a clinical trial to treat patients with qualifying diseases). 
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Before access to a drug under a treatment IND is granted, the 
patient's physician must first gain the manufacturer's permission to 
access the drug.48 Next, the patient must submit information to the 
FDA concerning her clinical history, the proposed treatment plan, 
and the supplying manufacturer, as well as statements of informed 
consent and investigator qualifications.49 Access is not automatic­
the regulations limit access based on the characteristics of the pa­
tient and the drug.50 A patient with a serious disease, in most situa­
tions, can only gain access to experimental drugs that are in Phase 
III of the clinical trial process.51 When the patient has an immedi­
ately life-threatening disease,52 he can potentially gain access to ex­
perimental drugs during Phase II, but the regulations indicate that 
access prior to Phase II ordinarily will not be granted.53 
Additionally, the FDA requires that several criteria be met to 
grant access to experimental drugs under a treatment IND.54 First, 
48. Physician Request for a Single Patient IND for Compassionate or Emergency 
Use, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, http://www.fda.gov/cder/cancerISingleIND. 
htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Physician Request for a Single Patient 
IND]. 
49. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.35(b); Physician Request for a Single Patient IND, supra 
note 48 (providing requirements and further contact information for obtaining a treat­
ment IND). 
50. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b). 
51. See id. § 312.24(a) ("In the case of a serious disease, a drug ordinarily may be 
made available for treatment use under this section during Phase 3 investigations or 
after all clinical trials have been completed; however, in appropriate circumstances, a 
drug may be made available for treatment use during Phase 2." (emphasis added)). A 
"serious disease" is not defined in this section of the code, but the definition can be 
inferred to be any disease that does not meet the definition of an "immediately life­
threatening disease." 
52. Id. § 312.34(b )(3)(ii) ("For the purpose of this section, an 'immediately life­
threatening' disease means a stage of a disease in which there is a reasonable likelihood 
that death will occur within a matter of months or in which premature death is likely 
without early treatment."); see also Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biologi­
cal Drug Product Regulations; Treatment Use and Sale, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,466, 19,467 
(May 22, 1987) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312) (clarifying that the FDA will use a "com­
mon sense interpretation" to determine whether there is an "immediate life-threatening 
disease"). 
53. 21 c.F.R. § 312.34(a) ("In the case of an immediately life-threatening disease, 
a drug may be made available for treatment use under this section earlier than Phase 3, 
but ordinarily not earlier than Phase 2." (emphasis added)). The FDA's refusal to grant 
approval for use of drugs in Phase I is likely justified by the fact that Phase I focuses 
exclusively on safety, with little attention to effectiveness. See id. § 312.21(a)(I) 
(describing Phase I of the clinical trial process). The Alliance's Citizen Petition sought 
to allow a treatment IND to be permitted prior to the second phase of the clinical trial 
process by removing the phrase "but ordinarily not earlier than Phase 2" from 21 
C.F.R. § 312.34(a). See Citizen Petition, supra note 19, at 3. 
54. 21 c.F.R. § 312.34(b). 
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the requested drug must be intended for the treatment of a "serious 
or immediately life-threatening disease."55 Second, the patient 
seeking the drug cannot have any other viable treatment options 
available.56 Third, the treatment IND may only request a drug that 
is being clinically testedY Finally, the manufacturer of the drug 
must be seeking market approval from the FDA for the experimen­
tal drug.58 
If these requirements are met, the regulations indicate that the 
"FDA shall permit" the treatment use of the experimental drug. 59 
However, the FDA can still deny the request for access, even after 
successful completion of these prerequisites.60 If the patient is re­
questing the drug to treat a serious disease, the request may be de­
nied "for treatment use ... if there is insufficient evidence of safety 
and effectiveness to support such use."61 Additionally, for a re­
quest based on an "immediately life-threatening disease,"62 the 
IND application can also be denied: 
[I]f the available scientific evidence, taken as a whole, fails to 
provide reasonable basis for concluding that the drug: 
(A) May be effective for its intended use in its intended pa­
tient population; or 
(B) Would not expose the patients to whom the drug is to 
be administered to an unreasonable and significant additional 
risk of illness or injury.63 
55. Id. § 312.34(b)(1)(i). 
56. !d. § 312.34(b)(1)(ii) ("There is no comparable or satisfactory alternative 
drug or other therapy available to treat that stage of the disease in the intended patient 
population ...."). 
57. Id. § 312.34(b)(1)(iii) ("The drug is under investigation in a controlled clinical 
trial under an IND in effect for the trial, or all clinical trials have been completed 
... . "). 
58. Id. § 312.34(b)(1)(iv) ("The sponsor of the controlled clinical trial is actively 
pursuing marketing approval of the investigational drug with due diligence."). 
59. Id. § 312.34(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
60. Id. § 312.34(b )(2)-(3). 
61. Id. § 312.34(b )(2). 
62. Id. § 312.34(b)(3). 
63. Id. § 312.34(b)(3)(i)(A)-(B) (emphasis added). This language seems to limit 
the treatment exception to only those individuals suffering from the specific disease for 
which the drug has undergone clinical testing. Otherwise, it would be difficult to see 
how the clinical evidence could provide a "reasonable basis" regarding effectiveness or 
exposure to additional risks for a disease on which the drug has not been tested. !d. 
The Alliance's Citizen Petition proposed adding the phrase "taking into account the 
risk of illness, injury, or death from the disease in the absence of the drug" to 21 C.F.R. 
§ 312.34(3)(i)(B), which the Alliance argued would balance the requirements of the 
regulation with the individual circumstances of the requesting individual. Citizen Peti­
tion, supra note 19, at 4. 
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These restrictions to the treatment IND regulation are at the 
center of the Alliance's litigation.64 The Alliance views these re­
strictions as ineffective for meeting the needs of terminally ill pa­
tients because they "accommodate only a small number of patients" 
even when the manufacturer is willing to provide the drug.65 
B. 	 A Fundamental Right or Not a Fundamental Right-That Is 
the Question 
The Alliance's complaint sought to enjoin the FDA "from con­
tinuing to enforce a policy that violates the constitutional privacy 
and liberty rights of terminally ill patients ... and their constitu­
tional guarantee against deprivation of life without due process."66 
The district court granted the FDA's motion to dismiss the Alli­
ance's complaint,67 which led to the two decisions that are the prin­
ciple subject of this Note.68 Before reviewing those decisions, the 
following section will provide a brief explanation of the standard 
fundamental rights analysis. 
1. 	 Analyzing Fundamental Rights-The Standard of Review 
To determine whether terminally ill patients have a fundamen­
tal right to access experimental medication, the Abigail Alliance de­
cisions relied on the Supreme Court's analysis in Washington v. 
Glucksberg.69 In Glucksberg, the Court followed its standard anal­
ysis regarding fundamental rights, which begins with an exploration 
64. 	 Complaint, supra note 8, at 1-2. 
65. 	 Id. at 6. 
66. Id. at 1. The Alliance also included in the complaint a count alleging that the 
"FDA's policy of prohibiting the sale of investigational drugs to willing and mentally 
competent patients with no other treatment options operates as a death sentence for 
those patients" because drug manufacturers are unwilling to provide drugs without 
charge. Id. at 10. 
67. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan, No. 
03-1601,2004 WL 3777340, at *12 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004), rev'd sub nom. Abigail Alli­
ance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006), vacated en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 
(2008). 
68. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es­
chenbach, (Abigail Alliance II), 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 
128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008); Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. 
von Eschenbach, (Abigail Alliance I), 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en bane, 
495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), eert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). 
69. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); see also Abigail Alliance II, 
495 F.3d at 702 (following the analysis set out in Glueksberg); Abigail Alliance I, 445 
F.3d at 477 (same). 
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of the "Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices."7o Since 
substantive due process issues regularly invoke issues outside of the 
explicit text of the Constitution, the Court is naturally reluctant to 
expand on rights when there is a lack of "guideposts for responsible 
decisionmaking."71 History and legal traditions provide the neces­
sary "guideposts" to allow courts to make responsible decisions 
rather than impose their own policy preferences.72 The reliance on 
these guideposts is important because protecting an asserted right 
on a constitutional basis will, "to a great extent, place the matter 
outside the arena of public debate and legislative action."73 
70. Glucksberg,521 U.S. at 710; see, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 849-50 (1992); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-79 
(1990); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
71. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 
U.S. 115, 125 (1992». 
72. [d. (citing Moore, 431 U.S. at 502). In Moore, the Court noted that the Loch­
ner era provides ample evidence of the dangers in allowing substantive liberties to ex­
pand based on "the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of 
[the] Court," instead of looking to the Constitution and Bill of Rights for guidance. 
Moore, 431 U.S. at 502. However, the impact that AIDS has had on the dynamic be­
tween the need for tighter drug regulations and earlier access to drugs could also be 
grounds for an "emerging awareness" argument for access to experimental drugs. See 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003) (noting that the "laws and traditions in 
the past half century" are the most relevant indication of history and tradition (empha­
sis added». The "emerging awareness" doctrine recognizes that an asserted right may 
be fundamental, even without a longstanding history and tradition in this country. Ar­
guably, this is due to shifting beliefs over time concerning what rights are fundamental. 
This doctrine is in conflict with the normal history and tradition approach to fundamen­
tal rights, which examines the nation's entire history and tradition. See Brian Hawkins, 
Note, The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since Lawrence v. Texas, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 409, 421 (2006) (noting that the focus on the past half century does 
not fit the traditional fundamental rights analysis). The "emerging awareness" ap­
proach to analyzing the right in Lawrence is analogous to the right asserted in Abigail 
Alliance. Experimental drugs were only recognized following the adoption of the Fed­
eral Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA), and more notably, the ability to 
regulate for safety was first ushered in under that Act. See Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.c. §§ 301-392 (2000». Effectiveness did not become a requirement until the 1962 
Drug Amendments, at which point the FDA approached its mandate very rigidly. See 
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.c. §§ 301-392); see also United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979). Since 
that time, the realities of such an inflexible approach to access to drugs have become 
increasingly clear. While the FDA still retains control over all experimental drugs, as 
well as early access to them, it is evident that access to those drugs can mean the differ­
ence between life and death. This "emerging recognition" should be an indication that 
preventing access to experimental drugs infringes the due process rights of terminally ill 
patients with no other viable treatment option. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572. 
73. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (emphasis added). It is important to note that the 
Court has stated that extending constitutional protection only removes the asserted 
right from the public discourse "to a great extent"-not entirely. [d. This phrasing 
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In addition to searching for history and traditions to serve as 
guideposts for the analysis of a fundamental right, a court also looks 
to see that there is a "careful description" of the liberty interest that 
is being asserted as fundamentaU4 In Abigail Alliance I, the appel­
late panel noted that the Supreme Court has not clearly articulated 
how precisely formulated an asserted right should be.75 There is 
precedent for identifying fundamental rights at the "most specific 
level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection 
to, the asserted right can be identified."76 This relatively restrictive 
view is mitigated by another view, which holds that "rights not ex­
pressed at "'the most specific level" [of generality] available' can 
nonetheless be recognized."77 
At the conclusion of the fundamental rights analysis, if the 
court determines that there is a fundamental liberty interest at 
stake, it will subject the infringing statute to strict scrutiny review.78 
stops short of saying that all public debate ceases when rights are deemed to be funda­
mental. Indeed, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), provides an excellent case study for 
this proposition. Following more than thirty years and numerous Supreme Court cases, 
the issue of abortion has remained a contentious topic that the Court continues to re­
visit. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 
914 (2000); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 505 U.S. 833; Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Nancy Hopkins, Editorial, Abortion Rights Linked 
to Issue of Greater Equality, THE SUNDAY PATRIOT (Harrisburg, Pa.), Jan. 20, 2008, at 
F1 (noting that abortion will playa role in deciding the 2008 presidential election); 
Brody Mullins, Campaign '08: Planned Parenthood to Push Candidacies, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 22,2008, at A6A (noting that Planned Parenthood anticipates spending $10 million 
to try and persuade one million people to vote for abortion-rights candidates in the 
2008 general election). 
74. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); 
Collins, 503 U.S. at 125; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277-78). 
75. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es­
chenbach, (Abigail Alliance I), 445 F.3d 470, 477 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en bane, 495 
F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). 
76. Id. (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989». 
77. Id. at 478 (alteration in original) (quoting Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 
(O'Connor, J., concurring». 
78. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721. The standard of review that a court applies 
in cases involving a fundamental right is generally strict scrutiny. When the legislation 
that infringes the fundamental right "comes before the Court," it is afforded "little pre­
sumption of constitutionality." MILTON R. KONVITZ, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: HISTORY 
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 151 (2001). When the right is deemed to be funda­
mental, only a compelling governmental interest can justify its infringement. Id. at 152­
53; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 797 (3d 
ed. 2006) ("If a right is deemed fundamental, the government must present a compel­
ling interest to justify an infringement."). Further, the methods used to achieve the 
compelling government interest must be the least restrictive means available, which 
means that the infringing legislation must be necessary to achieve that interest. 
CHEMERINSKY, supra. A simple showing that a regulation could be achieved in ways 
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For the infringing regulation to survive strict scrutiny, the regula­
tion must be "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state inter­
est."79 If the asserted right is not classified as fundamental, the 
level of review will be rationality review.so Rationality review, a 
much lower threshold of examination, requires that the regulation 
provide "a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest to jus­
tify the action."sl It is necessary to have these different standards 
of review in mind when considering the Alliance I and Alliance II 
decisions. 
2. Abigail Alliance I: Early Access as a Fundamental Right 
When the Alliance appealed the district court opinion, a di­
vided appellate panel reversed, finding that "a terminally ill, men­
tally competent adult patient's informed access to potentially life­
saving investigational new drugs ... warrants protection under the 
Due Process Clause."s2 The court's inquiry concerned whether ter­
minally ill patients who are mentally competent have a right to ob­
that would be less of an infringement will be sufficient to find the regulation unconstitu­
tional under strict scrutiny review. See id. Once strict scrutiny is applied, the burden of 
establishing that the infringing government action is the least restrictive alternative to 
meet a compelling interest is a high hurdle that the government is unlikely to meet. 
79. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Reno, 507 U.S. at 302); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 78, at 797 (noting the need 
for "a compelling interest to justify an infringement" of a fundamental right). 
80. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722. Conversely, if the right is not determined to be 
fundamental, a court will apply rationality review, which assumes judicial deference "to 
the legislative judgment" concerning the regulation. KONVITZ, supra note 78, at 150-51; 
see also Roger Pilon, The New Right to Life, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2007, at All (char­
acterizing the rational basis test as a "judicial abdication" by allowing the government 
to regulate "as long as it had any reason for restricting access"). Under this deferential 
standard, the infringing government action must only "be a reasonable way to achieve 
the goal," and not the least restrictive means of achieving it. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
78, at 797. Further, instead of requiring a compelling government interest, only a legiti­
mate government interest is required. If the right asserted is not defined as fundamen­
tal by the court, such as the right in Abigail Alliance II, the plaintiff must "prove that 
the government's restrictions bear no rational relationship to a legitimate state inter­
est." Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach 
(Abigail Alliance II), 495 F.3d 695, 712 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 128 S. 
Ct. 1069 (2008). The Abigail Alliance J/ court noted that "[t]he challenged policy 'need 
not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is 
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the 
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.'" [d. (quoting William­
son v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)). 
81. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722. 
82. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es­
chenbach, (Abigail Alliance I), 445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding 2-1 in favor 
of a fundamental right of access to experimental drugs by the terminally ill), vacated en 
bane, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). 
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tain "potentially life-saving post-Phase I investigational new drugs," 
even if the drugs carry risks for the patient.83 
The appeals court applied the fundamental rights analysis of 
Washington v. Glucksberg84 and concluded that the ability of an in­
dividual to access drugs had not been impaired "throughout the 
greater part of our Nation's history."85 The court indicated that the 
right asserted by the Alliance could be inferred from the Supreme 
Court's holding in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of 
Health,86 which suggests that liberty provides an individual with a 
"due process right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment."87 
The court provided further justification for its ruling by grounding 
its analysis in the historical foundation of the common law, which 
"included the right to self-defense and the right to self-preserva­
83. Id. at 472. The court also recognized that terminally ill patients are not acting 
on their own, but are in consultation with their doctors concerning the potential bene­
fits and hazards that could result from the experimental drugs. Id. 
84. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 703 ("The Court's established method of substantive­
due-process analysis has two primary features: First, the Court has regularly observed 
that the Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, ob­
jectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. Second, the Court has 
required a 'careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest." (citations 
omitted». 
85. Abigail Alliance I, 445 F.3d at 472. 
86. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). The petitioners in 
Cruzan were seeking the right to have their daughter removed from artificial nutrition 
and hydration, which would cause her death. Id. at 266-68. Their daughter was perma­
nently incapacitated and in a persistent vegetative state following a car accident. /d. 
The Court, in examining "whether Cruzan has a right under the ... Constitution which 
would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment," concluded that a 
state could "require[] ... evidence of the incompetent's wishes as to the withdrawal of 
treatment." Id. at 269, 280. The individual has the right to refuse medical treatment, 
but the state has a strong "interest in the protection and preservation of human life," 
which allowed it to require an evidentiary showing of the incompetent patient's wishes 
that treatment be withdrawn. Id. at 280. 
87. Id. According to the court of appeals, the right asserted by the Alliance was a 
naturally inferred proposition based on the right in Cruzan: 
[T]he Supreme Court in Cruzan recognized, in light of the common law and 
constitutionally protected liberty interests based on the inviolability of one's 
body, that an individual has a due process right to make an informed decision 
to engage in conduct, by withdrawing treatment, that will cause one's death. 
The logical corollary is that an individual must also be free to decide for her­
self whether to assume any known or unknown risks of taking a medication 
that might prolong her life. 
Like the right claimed in Cruzan, the right claimed by the Alliance to be 
free of FDA imposition does not involve treatment by the government or a 
government subsidy. Rather, much as the guardians of the comatose patient 
in Cruzan did, the Alliance seeks to have the government step aside by chang­
ing its policy so the individual right of self-determination is not violated. 
Id. at 484 (footnotes omitted). 
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tion."88 The court noted that under the common law, there is no 
general duty to rescue or preserve life, yet interfering with these 
efforts can create liability.89 The court looked at these common law 
doctrines as evidence of a historical basis for the right to self­
preserva tion. 
The court then turned to the history of drug regulation in the 
United States, conduding that, for the most part, the country 
lacked drug regulations prior to 1906.90 Additionally, the court 
found that, prior to 1962, there were no regulations that required 
drug manufacturers to provide evidence of a drug's effectiveness.91 
The court also focused on the omission of FDA regulations con­
cerning several "aspects of patient access to drugs," referring specif­
ically to the absence of regulations directed at physicians.92 
Physicians are able to prescribe drugs "off-label," which means a 
physician can prescribe "a drug to a patient for a purpose other 
than that for which the FDA has approved the use of the drug."93 
According to the court, permitting physicians to prescribe drugs to 
treat diseases other than those for which they have been approved 
undermines the FDA's insistence on the necessity of FDA approval 
of the drugs' safety and effectiveness prior to their availability.94 
Essentially, the court found little distinction between a physician 
prescribing a drug to treat a disease for which the drug has not been 
found to be effective and prescribing an experimental drug. 
88. Abigail Alliance 1, 445 F.3d at 480. 
89. 1d. The court viewed the effect of the FDA's regulations as creating this type 
of liability. Specifically, the court stated that "[b Jarring a terminally ill patient from the 
use of a potentially life-saving treatment impinges on th[e] right of self-preservation." 
1d. 
90. 1d. at 481. The court was referring to the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, 
which introduced, for the first time, regulations pertaining to drugs. See Pure Food and 
Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938); infra Part I.e.l for 
information regarding the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906. 
91. Abigail Alliance 1, 445 F.3d at 482. There were, however, regulations requir­
ing evidence of safety. 1d. In 1938, the FDCA was passed, which required that new 
drugs be proven safe for their intended use. In 1962, this Act was amended to require 
that new drugs also be proven effective for their intended use. See infra Part I.e.2-3 for 
further discussion on the FDCA and the 1962 Amendments. 
92. Abigail Alliance 1, 445 F.3d at 483. See generally Salbu, supra note 15 (pro­
viding an in-depth explanation of off-label use); Katherine A. Helm, Note, Protecting 
Public Health from Outside the Physician's Office: A Century of FDA Regulation from 
Drug Safety Labeling to Off-Label Drug Promotion, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. ME· 
DIA & ENT. LJ. 117, 152-54 (2008) (defining off-label use). 
93. Abigail Alliance 1, 445 F.3d at 483; see Salbu, supra note 15, at 186-88. 
94. See Abigail Alliance 1, 445 F.3d at 483. 
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The court's final point was based on its perception "that an 
individual must ... be free to decide for herself whether to assume 
any known or unknown risks of taking a medication that might pro­
long her life. "95 The court stated: "If there is a protected liberty 
interest in self-determination that includes a right to refuse life-sus­
taining treatment, even though this will hasten death, then the same 
liberty interest must include the complementary right of access to 
potentially life-sustaining medication, in light of the explicit protec­
tion accorded 'life."'96 Clearly, then, the court viewed the right of 
access to experimental drugs as fundamental, and it remanded the 
case to the district court to determine whether the FDA's regula­
tion violated this protected liberty interest.97 
3. 	 Abigail Alliance II: Early Access Is Not a Fundamental 
Right 
Rehearing was granted en banc and the full appellate court va­
cated the decision in Abigail Alliance 1,98 reaffirming the original 
holding of the district court.99 The en banc court viewed the ques­
tion presented by the Alliance as "whether the Constitution pro­
vides terminally ill patients a right to access to experimental drugs 
that have passed limited safety trials but have not been proven safe 
and effective."lOo The en banc court concluded that there is no fun­
95. 	 Id. at 484. 
96. Id. at 484-85. The court viewed this as "[t]he logical corollary" to the Su­
preme Court's determination in Cruzan "that an individual has a due process right to 
make an informed decision to engage in conduct, by withdrawing treatment that will 
cause one's death." Id. at 484. 
97. 	 Id. at 486. 
98. 	 Id. at 470. 
99. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es­
chenbach, (Abigail Alliance lJ), 495 F.3d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en bane), cert. de
nied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). The district court determined in Abigail Alliance for Better 
Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan that the Alliance's argument did not 
demonstrate a right that had "a longstanding tradition." Accordingly, it held there was 
no fundamental right at issue. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental 
Drugs v. McClellan, No. 03-1601, 2004 WL 3777340, at *10 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004), 
rev'd sub nom. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es­
chenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en bane, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), 
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). Again, the court was divided, with the two judges 
from the earlier decision maintaining that the right asserted was fundamental, and the 
remaining eight judges holding that the right asserted was not fundamental. See Pol­
lack, supra note 12 (recounting the decision to vacate the original appeals court ruling). 
100. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 697. As noted, the issue was initially framed 
by the panel decision as "whether the Due Process Clause protects the right of termi­
nally ill patients to make informed decisions that may prolong life." Abigail Alliance I, 
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damental right guaranteeing access to experimental drugs that is 
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."lOl 
The court began its analysis by reviewing the history and legal 
traditions related to drug regulation.102 In response to the Alli­
ance's assertion that efficacy of drugs was not regulated prior to 
1962,103 the court concluded that the Alliance failed to contemplate 
the regulation of drug safety.104 The regulations challenged by the 
Alliance prevented access to experimental drugs because they have 
not been proven effective or safe .105 As a result, the en banc court 
required the Alliance to show a tradition of access to drugs that 
have not had their safety or effectiveness established by the 
FDA.I06 In concluding that such a tradition did not exist, the court 
445 F.3d at 477; see also Pollack, supra note 12 (observing the change in the characteri­
zation of the right asserted by the Alliance). 
101. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 697 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997». 
102. Id. at 703. 
103. Id. 
104. [d. at 703-07. The court concluded that "[d]rug regulation in the United 
States began with the Colonies and States," and provided an overview of relevant legis­
lation to support this premise. Id. at 704-05. The court first pointed to legislation 
passed by the Colony of Virginia in 1736 regarding pharmacy as evidence of a long­
standing tradition of drug regulation. [d. at 705. However, this legislation was "for 
regulation of the fees and accounts of the practitioners of physic," and its primary pur­
pose had "no direct relation to the pharmacy laws of today." EDWARD KREMERS, 
GEORGE URDANG & GLENN SONNEDECKER, KREMERS AND URDANG'S HISTORY OF 
PHARMACY 158 (4th ed. 1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). In essence, this leg­
islation was designed by highly trained physicians as a means of establishing a tier sys­
tem of rates that could be charged by individuals based upon their training. !d. at 158­
59. Those practitioners who attended a university were permitted to charge roughly 
double the price for their services in dispensing drugs as individuals who were merely 
apprentices of surgeons or apothecaries. [d. at 158. The legislation noted that such 
apprentices were "very unskillful" and "demand excessive [f]ees," but mentions nothing 
regarding the safety or efficacy of drugs administered by "apprentices." [d. The legisla­
tion only stated that the practice of administering drugs in "greater [q]uantities ... than 
are necessary or useful" is "dangerous and intolerable." [d. While there can be no 
doubt that such practices are particularly troublesome, the statute itself did not address 
drug safety or efficacy, and only targeted the individuals administering medications. Id. 
at 158-59. This suggests that the law was more of a response to interest groups seeking 
to force their competition out of business. [d. Regardless, these laws fall short of mak­
ing any requirement that drugs must meet specific standards of safety and effectiveness, 
nor do they lend support for the en banc court's conclusions. 
105. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 703. 
106. [d. The court's focus on safety and effectiveness in this case fails to consider 
the population on whose behalf the Alliance is advocating. The requirement that drugs 
be safe and effective serves general public safety concerns, but these concerns are not 
present within the specific population of terminally ill patients. These patients, whom 
FDA regulations define as near death, often have nothing to gain from assurances of 
safety and efficacy. Terminal patients with no other viable treatment options are less 
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found "that our Nation has long expressed interest in drug regula­
tion, calibrating its response in terms of the capabilities to deter­
mine the risks associated with both drug safety and efficacy."lo7 
The court then examined the common law doctrines that the 
Alliance argued in support of its claim of a fundamental right of 
access to experimental drugs for the terminally il1.108 The en banc 
court ruled that: "the doctrine of necessity; ... the tort of inten­
tional interference with rescue; and ... the right to self-defense"109 
did not support the Alliance's argument.110 The court summarized 
its reasons as follows: 
[W]e conclude that the Alliance has not provided evidence of a 
right to procure and use experimental drugs that is deeply rooted 
in our Nation's history and traditions. To the contrary, our Na­
tion's history evidences increasing regulation of drugs as both the 
ability of government to address these risks has increased and the 
risks associated with drugs have become apparent. Similarly, our 
legal traditions of allowing a necessity defense, prohibiting inten­
tional interference with rescue, and recognizing a right of self­
defense cannot justify creating a constitutional right to assume 
any level of risk without regard to the scientific and medical judg­
ment expressed through the clinical testing process. II I 
Since the court found that the Alliance's argument failed to 
establish the existence of a fundamental right, it applied rational 
basis scrutiny to the Alliance's claim.112 Examining the regulations 
under this level of review, the court in Abigail Alliance II had little 
trouble determining that limiting access to experimental drugs 
serves a legitimate state interest.H3 
concerned with the safety or effectiveness of experimental drugs because the alternative 
is death. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 707-10. 
109. Id. at 707. 
110. Id. at 707-10. 
111. Id. at 711. 
112. Id. at 712. Rational basis scrutiny is the lowest level of judicial review that 
courts will apply in due process cases. This test is applied when the plaintiff is asserting 
a right that is not fundamental under the Constitution. Government regulation of such 
a right is permissible so long as there is a legitimate interest for the government's regu­
lation. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 78, at 797. 
113. Abigail Alliance /I, 495 F.3d at 712 ("[T]he FDA's policy of limiting access to 
investigational drugs is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of protecting 
patients, including the terminally ill, from potentially unsafe drugs with unknown thera­
peutic effects."). 
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C. 	 The History and Tradition of Safety and Efficacy in Federal 
Drug Regulations 
The en banc decision placed great emphasis on a lack of history 
and tradition for unfettered access to experimental drugS.114 How­
ever, the court deftly avoided a thorough discussion of the major 
federal legislation.115 The history of federal drug regulation dem­
onstrates gradual progression toward increased drug testing to en­
sure that drugs are not harmful. Each step toward tighter controls 
followed an event that caused public outcry and placed pressure on 
Congress to limit access to drugs that had not been vetted in a test­
ing process.116 The tightest controls were finally achieved in 1962 
with the Kefauver-Harris Amendments (Drug Amendments of 
1962).117 Yet, since then, they have faced opposition because the 
controls block access to certain drugs. In 1988, the FDA amended 
the regulations to allow some access to the terminally ill to experi­
mental drugs before they were fully approved.118 
1. 	 Labeling Concerns and the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 
1906 
Although the first federallegislation119-enacted in 1848-was 
designed to provide some general regulation of drugs, the Pure 
Food and Drugs Act of 1906120 is viewed as the initial step toward 
the tightening of federal control of drugS.121 Legislation addressing 
114. 	 [d. at 703·11. 
115. 	 Id. 
116. See PETER TEMIN, Taking Your Medicine: Drug Regulation in the United 
States 29 (1980). 
117. 	 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified at 21 
U.S.c. §§ 301-392 (2000)). 
118. 	 See infra Part LC.4. 
119. The earliest federal drug law of note was the Import Drug Act of 1848, 
which regulated the importation of drugs into the country, a topic outside the scope of 
this discussion. See Import Drug Act of 1848, 9 Stat. 237; Wesley J. Heath, America's 
First Drug Regulation Regime: The Rise and Fall of the Import Drug Act of 1848, 59 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 169 (2004); Wallace F. Janssen, Outline of the History of u.s. Drug 
Regulation and Labeling, 36 FOOD DRUG COSMo L.J. 420 (1981) (providing a general 
historical timeline of the FDA and pertinent legislation). 
120. Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384,34 Stat. 768 (repealed 
1938). 
121. See Joel E. Hoffman, Administrative Procedures of the Food and Drug Ad­
ministration, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 15, at 14-17 
(noting that the Pure Food and Drugs Act was inherently "a law enforcement statute" 
as opposed to a regulatory one); Note, Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments, 
60 GEO. L.J. 185, 185 (1971) [hereinafter Note, Drug Efficacy] (citing the Pure Food 
and Drugs Act as the first regulation of a "national scope" directed at drugs). 
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the purity of food had been submitted to Congress "throughout the 
1890s and early 1900s" with each attempt at regulation failing to 
gain approval.122 It was not until 1906, with the publication of 
Upton Sinclair's The Jungle, that "[p]ublic outrage" reached the 
ears and votes of Congress.123 
Operating under its Commerce Clause power, the Fifty-Ninth 
Congress passed legislation that penalized the "misbranding and 
adulteration" of drugs. 124 The Act defines "adulterated" as 
whether, at the time of sale, a drug "differs from the standard of 
strength, quality, or purity" as certified under testing.125 "Mis­
branded" refers to "all drugs, ... the package or label of which shall 
bear any statement, design, or device regarding such article, or the 
ingredients or substances contained therein which shall be false or 
misleading in any particular, and to any food or drug product which 
is falsely branded ...."126 Specifically, drugs were considered mis­
branded when they were advertised to be something they were not, 
or when the label was either inaccurate or had omitted statements 
regarding certain included contents.127 
122. TEMIN, supra note 116, at 28. 
123. Id. at 28-29; see also KREMERS, URDANG & SONNEDECKER, SUPRA note 104, 
at 220 (noting that Upton Sinclair's The Jungle helped to push public opinion in favor of 
federal regulation); UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906); HARVEY W. WILEY, THE 
HISTORY OF A CRIME AGAINST THE FOOD LAW 266 (Arno Press 1976) (1929) (" 'The 
Jungle,' brought public opinion to the pitch of indignant excitement."); JAMES HARVEY 
YOUNG, THE TOADSTOOL MILLIONAIRES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF PATENT MEDICINE IN 
AMERICA BEFORE FEDERAL REGULATION 239 (1961) ("The Jungle . .. described the 
filthy conditions under which America's meat was processed, ... how rats and the 
poisoned bread put out to catch them were ground up with meat for public consump­
tion, [and] how employees now and then slipped into steamy vats and next went forth 
into the world as Durham's Pure Leaf Lard."). See generally SINCLAIR, supra. 
124. KREMERS, URDANG & SONNEDECKER, supra note 104, at 220 (emphasis 
added); see also Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, § 1, 34 Stat. 768, 
768 (repealed 1938) ("[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture ... any ... 
drug which is adulterated or misbranded."). 
125. Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 § 7 (At most, the requirement that a drug 
not exceed the accepted standard of "strength, quality, or purity" at the time of sale is 
the only indication under this act that suggests that the drafters were concerned with 
the safety of drugs.). 
126. Id. § 8. 
127. 	 Section 8 of the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 states: 
First. If it be an imitation of or offered for sale under the name of an­
other article. 
Second. If the contents of the package as originally put up shall have 
been removed, in whole or in part, and other contents shall have been placed 
in such package, or if the package fail to bear a statement on the label of the 
quantity or proportion of any alcohol, morphine, opium, cocaine, heroin, al­
pha or beta eucaine, chloroform, cannabis indica, chloral hydrate, or acetani­
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These portions of the Pure Food and Drugs Act demonstrate 
that the Act itself was not designed to promote safety and efficacy 
of drugs; under the plain meaning of the statute, it was meant "to 
assure the customer of the identity of the article purchased, not of 
[the drug's] usefulness."128 The law did not prevent the individual 
consumer from self-medicating either, but it did seek to make self­
medication safer by requiring drug manufacturers to be truthful 
about a drug's contents.129 Despite its shortcomings, the 1906 law 
set the foundation for future drug regulation.130 
2. 	 Drug Safety and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act of 1938 
The deaths of over one hundred people due to the toxic effects 
of "Elixir Sulfanilamide"131 led directly to the introduction of the 
legislation that is currently in force today.132 The FDCA took steps 
to overcome the problems of the 1906 law and give the federal go v­
lide, or any derivative or preparation of any such substances contained 
therein. 
[d. 
128. TEMIN, supra note 116, at 33; see also HILTS, supra note 10, at 68 ("The 1906 
law was built on the idea that false claims must be prosecuted, rather than addressing 
the real issues of whether ... drugs put on the market were safe and worked as they 
claimed."); Helm, supra note 92, at 126 ("The 1906 Act served its somewhat 'laissez­
faire' purpose of at least putting the public on notice about the contents of commer­
cially available drug products. It did not, however, address either the safety or efficacy 
of the drug products, other than in the context of false or misleading claims of therapeu­
tic effect."). 
129. YOUNG, supra note 123, at 244; see also TEMIN, supra note 116, at 22-23 
(noting that patients in the late nineteenth century did not need a prescription to obtain 
a drug, and "[a]ny drug that could be obtained with a prescription could also be ob­
tained without one"). Early regulations were not concerned with drugs, but with licens­
ing of individuals dispensing drugs. TEMIN, supra note 116, at 22-23. "[M]edical 
licensing laws prohibited nondoctors from 'practising [sic] medicine,'" but they had no 
effect on the access to drugs by the general public. [d. at 23. "Patients did not need to 
go to a doctor to get a drug; nor were they bound by the doctor's selection if they did." 
[d. Members of the public were free to choose-among the various drugs available­
which ones they wanted to take. [d. 
130. KREMERS, URDANG & SONNEDECKER, supra note 104, at 221. 
131. [d.; see also TEMIN, supra note 116, at 42-43 (recounting the "Elixir Sulfanil­
amide disaster" and the impact it had on the passage of the FDCA); Janssen, supra note 
119, at 429 (noting that Elixir Sulfanilamide, a "poisonous solvent," killed over one 
hundred people). Elixir sulfanilamide was a sulfur drug designed to "treat strep throat 
and other infections" that also contained a highly toxic substance that was called 
diethylene glycol. Stephen Mihm, A Tragic Lesson, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 26, 2007, at 
3. 
132. TEMIN, supra note 116, at 43. 
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ernment more control over drugs in general.133 The new Act made 
several important changes that were relevant to the claims of the 
Abigail Alliance.134 Section 505 of the FDCA created, in effect, a 
class system of drugs by requiring an application for any new drug 
prior to public distribution.135 To gain market access under the 
Act, the manufacturer now needed to produce evidence demon­
strating that the drug was safe for use.136 New drugs are "[a]ny 
133. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 
1040 (codified as amended at 21 u.s.c. §§ 301-392 (2000»; see also H.R. REP. No. 74­
2755, at 3 (1936) ("The measure contains substantially all the features of the old law 
that have proved valuable in promoting honesty and fair dealing. But it amplifies and 
strengthens the provisions designed to safeguard the public health and prevent decep­
tion ... and it strengthens the procedural provisions to make more certain the accom­
plishment of its purpose."); TEMIN, supra note 116, at 42-46 (noting the increased 
requirements of the regulation over its predecessor, the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 
1906); Joel E. Hoffman, Administrative Procedures of the Food and Drug Administra­
tion, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 15, at 19 (noting that 
the Act moved beyond a police function into "direct regulation of the industries within 
its jurisdiction"). 
134. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es­
chenbach, (Abigail Alliance 1), 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en bane, 495 F.3d 
695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). 
135. See H.R. REP. No. 75-2139, at 3 (1938) ("A definition of the term 'new drug' 
is provided for the purpose of applying section 505, a provision intended to require 
adequate testing of new drugs to determine their safety before they are placed on the 
market."); TEMIN, supra note 116, at 44. This new class of drug is an "experimental 
drug," which required evidence of safety prior to approval. Previously, a manufacturer 
could immediately market the drug. Once the FDA approved the manufacturer's new 
drug application, the "experimental" classification of the drug was removed. 
136. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505: 
(a) No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate 
commerce any new drug, unless an application filed pursuant to subsection (b) 
is effective with respect to such drug. 
(b) Any person may file with the Secretary an application with respect to 
any drug subject to the provisions of subsection (a). Such person shall submit 
to the Secretary as a part of the application (1) full reports of investigations 
which have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use .... 
[d. (emphasis added). Additionally, the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com­
merce reported that: 
Section 505 (a) requires new drugs to be adequately tested before they 
are commercialized. In order to insure that the tests made have been com­
plete, the introduction of a new drug in interstate commerce is prohibited un­
less the manufacturer has submitted full information showing that the drug has 
been adequately tested and has not been found to be unsafe for use under the 
conditions prescribed in the labeling. This is not a license provision, but is 
intended merely to prevent the premature marketing of new drugs not prop­
erly tested for safety .... 
. . . The provision merely sets up a method for the authoritative review of 
the manufacturer's tests and will not unreasonably delay the introduction of 
new drugs in the market. 
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drug the composition of which is such that such drug is not gener­
ally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and 
experience to evaluate the safety of drugs, as safe for use under the 
conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling 
thereof ...."137 The 1938 Act imposed safety requirements for the 
first time but did not address issues of efficacy. 
This new law also represented a change in policyP8 Under the 
1906 Act, consumers were allowed to make their own decisions re­
garding drugs so long as they had information that correctly de­
scribed the drug's composition.139 The new law required, in 
addition to making sure the drug was "safe," that drug manufactur­
ers provide instructions for using the drug.14° Although the regula­
tions restricted what drugs made it to the market, the overall 
"choice of drugs" was still left to the individual consumer, albeit 
with new efforts geared toward safety.141 
3. 	 Drug Effectiveness, the 1962 Drug Amendments, and a 
Challenge to the "New" Status Quo 
The FDCA was given sharper teeth in the early 1960s following 
three years of congressional investigations.142 Initially, these inves­
tigations focused on problems with testing, marketing, and drug 
costs, but they culminated at the same time as another drug-related 
catastrophe.143 Late in 1961, an outbreak of phocomelia, a birth 
defect that causes deformed hands and feet, was reported "with 
H.R. REP. No. 75-2139, at 9 (emphasis added). This statute was the predecessor of 
what eventually became the IND application. See Joel E. Hoffman, Administrative Pro­
cedures of the Food and Drug Administration, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGU· 
LATION, supra note 15, at 23 (classifying Section 505 as a means for the FDA to assert 
administrative review over the safety tests of a manufacturer). 
137. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201(p)(I) (emphasis added); see 
also ESTES KEFAUVER, IN A FEW HANDS: MONOPOLY POWER IN AMERICA 78 (1965) 
("The 1938 food and drug law required merely that new drugs, to be cleared for mar­
keting, be proved safe."); Janssen, supra note 119, at 429 ("Drug manufacturers were 
required to provide scientific proof that new products could be safely used before put­
ting them on the market ...."). 
138. See TEMIN, supra note 116, at 45; Joel E. Hoffman, Administrative Proce­
dures of the Food and Drug Administration, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGU· 
LATION, supra note 15, at 19 (shifting from a policing function to a regulatory function). 
139. See Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 769 (codi­
fied at 21 U.S.c. § 1-15 (2000)) (repealed 1938); TEMIN, supra note 116, at 45. 
140. See TEMIN, supra note 116, at 45; Helm, supra note 92, at 127. 
141. TEMIN, supra note 116, at 45. 
142. KEFAUVER, supra note 137, at 77-78. 
143. [d. at 77; see also KREMERS, URDANG & SONNEDECKER, supra note 104, at 
222 (noting that thalidomide was the cause of birth defects); TEMIN, supra note 116, at 
123 (discussing thalidomide in Europe); Helm, supra note 92, at 128. 
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alarming frequency in Germany and other European countries."144 
The source of the outbreak was identified as thalidomide, a popular 
sleep-aid in Europe that was "widely prescribed off-label to preg­
nant women" to ease morning sickness.145 Thalidomide was await­
ing approval by the FDA when it was identified as the source of the 
phocomelia outbreak in Europe.146 
Following the thalidomide disaster, the 1962 amendments in­
creased the FDCA's drug safety requirements by adding an addi­
tional hurdle requiring manufacturers to demonstrate that a drug is 
effective for a specific purpose.147 Additionally, the amendment to 
the 1938 Act altered the definition of "new drug" to "[a]ny drug the 
composition of which is such that such drug is not generally recog­
nized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience 
to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effec­
tive for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or sug­
gested in the labeling thereof ...."148 
The 1962 amendments substantially changed the process that 
drugs undergo before reaching the public. The FDA became ac­
tively involved in the approval process and was required to approve 
new drugs affirmatively before they entered the market.149 The 
FDA also pre-approved the testing process employed by manufac­
turers to demonstrate safety and effectiveness.15o Moreover, the 
Drug Amendments of 1962 initiated a revamped verSIOn of the 
144. TEMIN, supra note 116, at 123; see also KREMERS, URDANG & SON­
NEDECKER, supra note 104, at 222 (noting that thalidomide "was undergoing wide­
spread and not too tightly controlled clinical trials in the United States"). 
145. Helm, supra note 92, at 128-29. 
146. TEMIN, supra note 116, at 123; see also Helm, supra note 92, at 128 (noting 
that thalidomide was responsible for birth defects across Europe). 
147. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.c. §§ 301-392 (2000»; KEFAUVER, supra note 137, at 78 ("[D]rugs 
must be proved efficacious for the conditions for which they are recommended."); see 
also HENRY G. GRABOWSKI, DRUG REGULATION AND INNOVATION: EMPIRICAL EVI­
DENCE AND POLICY OPTIONS 15 (1976) (The 1962 Drug Amendments "required firms 
to provide documented scientific evidence on a new drug's efficacy in addition to the 
proof of safety required by the 1938 act."). The new requirements of the 1962 amend­
ment also had an impact on the availability of drugs because of the heightened require­
ment of demonstrating that the drug was effective for treating specific illnesses. 
OAKLEY RAY & CHARLES KSIR, DRUGS, SOCIETY, AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 63 (Mc­
Graw-Hill Companies, Inc., 8th ed. 1999) (1972); see also Janssen, supra note 119, at 438 
(noting that after the 1962 amendments, safety and effectiveness must be shown with 
substantial evidence). 
148. See Drug Amendments of 1962 § 102(a). 
149. TEMIN, supra note 116, at 125. 
150. Id. 
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"New Drug Application," first established under the 1938 Act, but 
now with higher standards for safety and effectiveness. lSI 
The new amendments were not welcomed by everyone and 
spawned litigation regarding access to drugs that failed to meet the 
new requirements of safety and effectiveness. lS2 In United States v. 
Rutherford,lS3 a case strikingly similar to the Abigail Alliance cases, 
the Supreme Court addressed whether the new safety and effective­
ness requirements of the FDCA applied to the use of unapproved 
drugs by terminally ill cancer patients.1s4 A group of patients initi­
ated the action to enjoin the FDA from removing the cancer drug 
Laetrile from the market. lss Laetrile had been redefined as a new 
drug after the 1962 amendments took effect, and the absence of 
"scientific studies of Laetrile's safety or effectiveness" precluded 
FDA approva1.1S6 The Court concluded that terminally ill cancer 
patients were not a class exempt from the statute's requirements, 
and, therefore, they had no right to access drugs that did not meet 
the new FDCA requirements of safety and effectiveness.1s7 The 
Court refused to "accept the proposition that the safety and efficacy 
151. Drug Amendments of 1962 §§ 102-104. The "New Drug Application" pro­
cess, in its current form, is briefly outlined in Part LA.1. 
152. See Puckett, supra note 26, at 645-50 (reviewing other litigation that has 
challenged the FDA's new drug approval process). 
153. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979). Rutherford provides fur­
ther support for the Abigail Alliance [ decision by noting that the FDCA of 1938 first 
established safety requirements for new drugs and the 1962 Drug Amendments added 
effectiveness as a prerequisite to new drug approval. [d. at 552. The Supreme Court's 
assertion on this point directly contradicts the claim in Abigail Alliance II that "at least 
some drug regulation prior to 1962 addressed efficacy." Abigail Alliance for Better 
Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach (Abigail Alliance II), 495 F.3d 695, 
706 (D.C. CiT. 2007) (en bane), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). 
154. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 546; see also FRED H. DEGNAN, FDA's CREATIVE 
ApPLICATION OF THE LAW: NOT MERELY A COLLECfION OF WORDS 74-78 (2000) (re­
counting the litigation involving Laetrile and the FDA). While the Court in Rutherford 
was not addressing whether a terminally ill patient had a fundamental right to access 
experimental medication, the decision set the stage for the Abigail Alliance litigation. 
If the "safety and effectiveness" requirements of the FDCA apply to all persons, not 
just those with curable diseases, it seems that this precedent would only allow termi­
nally ill patients to access experimental drugs through a due process right. 
155. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 548. 
156. [d. at 549-50. 
157. [d. at 554; see also Helm, supra note 92, at 132 (noting that the Court in 
Rutherford viewed the 1962 amendments as mandating the FDA to prevent market 
access to drugs whose therapeutic benefit did not outweigh their potential danger); An­
drew Bridges, Dying Patients' Lawsuit Will Go On: They Want Access to Experimental 
Drugs that Won't Be FDA-Approved in Time to Help Them, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
May 3, 2006, at A7 (noting that the Rutherford Court ruled that there was no exemp­
tion in the safety and effectiveness standards of the FDCA for terminally ill patients). 
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standards of the [FDCA had] no relevance for terminal patients" 
because it would "deny the [FDA] Commissioner's authority over 
all drugs" for the terminally il1.158 This claim would be addressed 
anew when the FDA decided to relax the strict preclusion of access 
prior to its approval of a new drug.159 
4. 	 FDA Rulemaking-Early Access Through the Treatment 
IND Regulations of 1988 
While the chemically induced catastrophes of the early- and 
mid-twentieth century led to tighter drug regulations,16o the health 
epidemics of the late-twentieth century demonstrated the need for 
greater flexibility. Diseases such as AIDS caused a shift of focus 
from the safety and efficacy of drugs to the preservation of life, 
despite the risks of potentially harmful side effects of unproven 
medications.161 
In response to a call for earlier access to promising drugs, the 
FDA adopted regulations for the treatment use of new drugs under­
going clinical testing.162 In contrast to the holding in United States 
v. Rutherford, which affirmed the FDA's strict approach to safety 
and effectiveness requirements for all drugs, the new regulations 
158. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 557. The Court provided additional support for this 
proposition, arguing that "to exempt from the Act drugs with no proved effectiveness 
... 'would lead to needless deaths and suffering among ... patients characterized as 
"terminal" who could actually be helped by legitimate therapy.'" Id. (quoting Lae­
trile-Commissioner's Decision, 42 Fed. Reg. 39,768, 39,805 (Aug. 5, 1977)). While it is 
arguable that this case would be a hindrance to the Alliance's argument, it is important 
to remember that the Alliance is seeking access to experimental drugs for those termi­
nally ill patients with no other viable treatment option only, and not access that would 
allow the terminally ill to choose between experimental and generally accepted treat­
ments. See Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 70l. 
159. See Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Reg­
ulations; Treatment Use and Sale, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,466, 19,473 (May 22, 1987) (codified 
at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312). 
160. See supra text accompanying notes 131-133, 143-146. 
161. Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS, Experimental Drug Approval, and the FDA 
New Drug Screening Process, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'y 295, 295-96 (2000); see 
also Geoffrey M. Levitt, James N. Czaban & Andrea S. Paterson, Human Drug Regula­
tion, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 15, at 172 (noting that 
complaints about drug approval delays from many groups, including AIDS patients, 
prompted initiatives designed to get drugs to qualifying patients sooner); Goldberg, 
supra note 24, at 26 ("Spurred in part by the AIDS epidemic, faster access to new drugs 
has been an increasingly popular position for decades."). 
162. Treatment Use of an Investigational New Drug, 21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (2008); 
see also supra notes 40-65 and accompanying text. 
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took a more lenient approach.163 The FDA acknowledged a need 
for "separate standard[ s] for drugs intended to treat immediately 
life-threatening diseases" based on "the different risk-benefit con­
siderations involved in treating such diseases."l64 This shift arises 
from balancing the risks of death from terminal illnesses, such as 
AIDS, against the goals of the regulations.165 Early access regula­
tions now provide an avenue for qualified individuals to gain early 
access to experimental drugS.166 
II. Is ACCESS TO EXPERIMENTAL DRUGS 

A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT? 

Whether or not the Constitution safeguards proposed rights 
that are not specifically enumerated is a contentious topic infused 
with passion and logic.167 The answer, unequivocally under Su­
163. The logic rejected in United States v. Rutherford, "that the safety and efficacy 
standards of the Act have no relevance for terminal patients," is consistent with the 
treatment exception. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 557-58. In the final issued rule, the FDA 
argued that the treatment exception fits within the holding of the Rutherford decision. 
However, the greater focus on "risk balancing" supports a policy shift by the FDA away 
from strict interpretation of the new drug requirements to a more flexible approach. 
See Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; 
Treatment Use and Sale, 52 Fed. Reg. at 19,473 (noting that the new regulations would 
not conflict with Rutherford); DEGNAN, supra note 154, at 79 (The treatment IND is 
"fundamentally at odds with the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Rutherford 
in that the new drug approval requirements of the Act apply equally to all drugs, in­
cluding drugs intended for treating terminal diseases."). 
164. Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regula­
tions; Treatment Use and Sale, 52 Fed. Reg. at 19,468 (rationalizing the intent of the 
Treatment IND regUlation). But see Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 549-50 ("The [FDCA] 
makes no special provision for drugs used to treat terminally ill patients."); Helm, supra 
note 92, at 133 (clarifying the holding in Rutherford as preventing the FDA from "side­
step[ping] its own regulations for terminally ill patients and peremptorily opt[ing] for 
speed over safety"). 
165. Greenberg, supra note 161, at 349; see plso Investigational New Drug, An­
tibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Treatment Use and Sale, 52 Fed. 
Reg. at 19,468 (acknowledging "the different risk-benefit considerations involved in 
treating [immediately life-threatening] diseases"); DEGNAN, supra note 154, at 71. Fol­
lowing the passage of the 1962 Drug Amendments, the FDA manifested an "inflexible 
interpretation of the provisions." DEGNAN, supra note 154, at 71. However, faced with 
the realities of modern diseases like AIDS, the FDA has taken "a proactive flexible 
interpretation" of the requirements of the FDCA. [d. 
166. See supra Part I.A.2 for more information regarding the treatment use of 
experimental drugs. 
167. See, e.g., SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL IN­
TERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS (2007) (examining various methods of constitu­
tional interpretation); 3 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND ITS INTERPRETATION (Jules L. 
Coleman ed., 1994) (discussing constitutional theory and interpretation); LESLIE FRIED­
MAN GOLDSTEIN, IN DEFENSE OF THE TEXT: DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL THE­
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preme Court precedent, is yes. The Constitution says nothing con­
cerning the protection of family or reproductive autonomy, sexual 
activity or orientation, or control over medical decisions-but 
rights that fall under these general concepts have all been recog­
nized as fundamental.1 68 The controversy over the inclusion of 
these "unenumerated" rights is based on the ideological split be­
tween those "who believe that the Court must confine [decisions] to 
norms clearly stated or implied in the language of the Constitu­
tion," and those "who believe that the Court may protect norms not 
mentioned in the Constitution's text ...."169 Since these rights are 
not specifically provided for in the Constitution, the Court must un­
dertake a careful analysis to determine how and why these rights 
fall under the umbrella of protections that the Constitution gives to 
individual citizens.17o 
The following sections will discuss how proposed fundamental 
rights are analyzed. First is a discussion of how a potential funda­
mental right is framed, as well as how the rights in the Abigail ALli­
ance cases were framed. l71 The discussion will then proceed to the 
ORY (1991) (analyzing constitutional theory and arguing in defense of a textualist 
approach to interpreting the Constitution); JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL IN­
TERPRETATION: ILLUSION AND REALITY (2001) (reviewing constitutional interpretation 
throughout different time periods and approaches). 
168. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 78, at 791-919; see also, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (right to the private sexual activity of consenting adults); Cruzan v. 
Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (right of competent adults to refuse 
medical treatment); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (right of parents to have 
custody of their children); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to choose to termi­
nate a pregnancy prior to viability); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right to 
decide whether to bear or beget children); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to 
marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy includes matters 
concerning contraception); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to con­
trol educational upbringing); cf Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (no 
fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide). 
169. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, Interpreting the Constitution 1 (1987); see also BAR­
BER & FLEMING, supra note 167 (discussing the topic of constitutional interpretation); 
SHAMAN, supra note 167 (discussing different viewpoints of interpretation); Thomas C. 
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975) (examining 
the differences between pure textual interpretations of the Constitution and those inter­
pretations that delve into inferences derived from the Constitution). Compare Bowers 
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,194 (1986) (noting that the Supreme Court comes the closest 
"to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law" that has no connec­
tion to "the language or design of the Constitution"), with Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 
(noting that the Constitution contains "penumbras, formed by emanations from those 
guarantees that help give them life and substance," in which the Court has inferred 
rights that cannot be found within the Constitution's four corners). 
170. See supra notes 69-81 and accompanying text. 
171. See infra Part II.A. 
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historical guideposts employed by courts to determine whether the 
defined right is "fundamental."l72 This section will also discuss the 
Abigail Alliance II court's erroneous historical analysis of drug reg­
ulation, as well as previous Supreme Court conclusions about the 
history of drug regulation. 173 This Analysis will ultimately conclude 
that the Abigail Alliance II court misinterpreted and misapplied the 
fundamental rights analysis, and that a proper application would 
have enabled the Alliance's arguments to succeed.174 
A. Carefully Framing Rights into Extinction 
Before a court can determine that a government regulation is 
unconstitutional, it must first conclude that a constitutional right is 
being infringed. To make this determination, the court must first 
define the right that is before it. How the asserted right is defined 
can dramatically sway the outcome of a court's analysis.175 Gener­
ally, to permit the law to remain consistent and certain, an asserted 
right must be grounded on some previously recognized right. 176 
How broadly a right is defined is an important consideration that 
can greatly impact a court's fundamental rights analysis.177 
Defining a previously recognized right in an abstract and broad 
sense will make it easier for a newly asserted right to fall within 
recognized precedent; however, an expansive definition could pro­
duce undesired consequences, which would sway a court to reject 
the description urged.178 At the other end of the spectrum, nar­
172. See infra Part II.B. 
173. See infra Part II.B.1-2. 
174. See infra Part II.B-C. 
175. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es­
chenbach, (Abigail Alliance II), 495 F.3d 695, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("[T]he description 
of the right is of crucial importance-too broad and a right becomes all-encompassing 
and impossible to evaluate; too narrow and a right appears trivial."), cert. denied, 128 S. 
Ct. 1069 (2008). 
176. LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, On Reading the Constitution 72 
(1991); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decision­
making and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68 (1991) (addressing the various ap­
proaches of Supreme Court Justices when confronted with precedent and its role in 
constitutional decisionmaking); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 
(1987) (examining the concept of precedent and its impact on judicial decisions). 
177. See TRIBE & DORF, supra note 176, at 73; Puckett, supra note 26, at 659 
(noting that if the asserted right is given a narrow definition by the Court, the right is 
usually not seen as fundamental, while a broader definition will denote a right that is 
fundamental). 
178. See Abigail Alliance fl, 495 F.3d at 701 n.5 ("If the asserted right is so broad 
that it protects a person's efforts to save his life, it might subject to strict scrutiny any 
government action that would affect the means by which he sought to do so, no matter 
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rowly interpreting the right can lead to a similar resulP79 If the 
asserted right is described too narrowly, its relation to the precedent 
rights becomes so tenuous that making the inferential leap from 
one right to the next becomes impossible. Likewise, if the prece­
dent right is interpreted too narrowly, new rights will be unable to 
fit within its definition.180 
Both Abigail Alliance decisions provide an excellent demon­
stration of how the interpretation of rights can influence a court's 
holding. In finding support for a fundamental right to experimental 
drugs, the initial appellate decision focused more attention on the 
broader assertion that an individual has a right to take steps to pre­
serve her life. 181 The focus on preservation of life was based on an 
ability to make "informed decision[s]" and to "assume ... known or 
unknown risks"182 concerning experimental drugs. This approach 
focused more on why there should be access to experimental drugs. 
how remote the chance of success."); TRIBE & DORF, supra note 176, at 73 ("The more 
abstractly one states the already-protected right, the more likely it is that the claimed 
right will be protected under its rubric."); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
702, 724 (1997). Here, the respondents argued that "broad, individualistic principles ... 
protect[] the 'liberty of competent, terminally ill adults to make end-of-life decisions 
free of undue government interference.'" The Court framed the issue as "whether the 
protections of the Due Process Clause include a right to commit suicide with another's 
assistance." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 724. 
179. See Mark S. Kende, The Constitutionality of the Death Penalty: South Africa 
as a Model for the United States, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 209 (2006) (noting that 
one of the differences between fundamental rights analysis in South Africa and in the 
United States is the ability of our courts to achieve a limitation of rights through a 
narrow interpretation of rights). Narrowly interpreting rights can achieve this result in 
two ways. First, asserting a new right often requires the use of precedent. By defining a 
right narrowly, the asserted right can no longer fit within precedent. Second, since 
courts use evidence of history and tradition to support asserted rights, a court can de­
fine a right so narrowly that finding history and tradition in support of the right is 
nearly impossible. 
180. ld. 
181. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es­
chenbach, (Abigail Alliance I), 445 F.3d 470, 477 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("The question 
presented ... is whether the Due Process Clause protects the right of terminally ill 
patients to make an informed decision that may prolong life, specifically by the use of 
potentially life-saving new drugs ...." (emphasis added)), vacated en bane, 495 F.3d 695 
(D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). But see Goldberg, supra note 24, 
at 25 ("Under the court's approach, it will be difficult to find a tradition of government 
regulation for any new technology."). 
182. Abigail Alliance I, 445 F.3d at 484. Ultimately, the court concluded that 
there was a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment that recognizes: 
[T]he right of terminally ill patients to make an informed decision that may 
prolong life, specifically by use of potentially life-saving new drugs that the 
FDA has yet to approve for commercial marketing but that the FDA has de­
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In stark contrast, the en banc decision framed the right by fo­
cusing on how a terminally ill individual would attempt to preserve 
her life. The court reinterpreted the broader definition suggested 
by the Alliance,183 summarizing it as "whether terminally ill pa­
tients have a fundamental right to experimental drugs that have 
passed Phase I clinical testing."184 This narrower definition 
changed the course of the analysis and limited the ability of the 
Alliance to rely on the fundamental right set forth in Cruzan, which 
the court also narrowly defined.185 The en banc court's narrow def­
inition of the right at issue was an error because the protection of 
rights under substantive due process concerns the protection of 
broad concepts, not specific rights. Substantive due process guaran­
tees privacy and liberty. The rights that are found to violate sub­
stantive due process are those that infringe on these larger 
guarantees-for example, the infringement on a pregnant woman's 
privacy right in determining whether to terminate her pregnancy 
prior to the fetus's viability.l86 It is only by application of these 
broader concepts that specific actions garner the protection of the 
Constitution. The Abigail Alliance II court failed to observe this, 
which was readily demonstrated by the Supreme Court in both the 
Cruzan and Glucksberg decisions.187 
In Glucksberg, the Court clarified the holding of Cruzan as a 
recognition "that the ... Constitution would grant a competent per­
son a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration 
termined, after Phase I clinical human trials, are safe enough for further test­
ing on a substantial number of human beings. 
[d. at 477 (emphasis added). 
183. Abigail Alliance ll, 495 F.3d at 701 ("Whether the liberty protected by the 
Due Process Clause embraces the right of a terminally ill patient with no remaining 
approved treatment options to decide, in consultation with his or her own doctor, 
whether to seek access to investigational medications that the [FDA] concedes are safe 
and promising for substantial human testing." (emphasis added) (alteration in original) 
(citing Appellants' Brief at 1, Abigail Alliance ll, 495 F.3d 695 (04-5350))). 
184. [d. 
185. [d. at 711 n.19 (defining the right in Cruzan as a "right to refuse lifesaving 
hydration and nutrition" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
186. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) ("[T]he Court has recognized 
that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does 
exist under the Constitution .... This right of privacy ... is broad enough to encompass 
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."). 
187. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (limiting Cruzan by not 
including decisions that would allow an individual to initiate her own death); Cruzan v. 
Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that liberty interests allow 
individuals the right to make decisions regarding their own care). 
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and nutrition,"188 which was supported by '''the [broader] right of a 
competent individual to refuse medical treatment."'189 The Court 
concluded that assisted suicide fell outside the type of decisions that 
were deemed fundamentally personal in Cruzan.190 Glucksberg's 
clarification demonstrates that Cruzan recognized a right to make 
decisions regarding an individual's medical treatment; yet it limited 
the decision by excluding the right to intentionally hasten death. 
The broader fundamental right of Cruzan 191 was not going to pro­
vide a shield for the specific act in Glucksberg.192 
This distinction is important because the Abigail Alliance II 
court failed to invoke the broader concepts of Cruzan entirely. In­
stead, the court relegated its discussion of the precedent to a foot­
note and focused on the specific medical treatment that the 
Alliance was ultimately attempting to access.193 In Abigail Alliance 
II, the en banc court viewed Cruzan as providing a right to refuse 
treatment, not a right to make a decision regarding treatment, 
which is arguably inherent in the Cruzan Court's analysis.194 This 
micro approach focused specifically on what the petitioner in 
188. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279). 
189. Id. at 724 (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277). 
190. Id. at 705; see also Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical 
Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 311 (2008) (noting that the 
Supreme Court supported a fundamental right "to refuse even life-saving medical treat­
ment" in Cruzan, but "declined to extend" this right to medical decisions designed to 
"hasten death" in Glucksberg). 
191. Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261 (right to refuse treatment and make medical 
decisions) . 
192. Glucksberg; 521 U.S. 702 (physician-assisted suicide). 
193. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es­
chenbach, (Abigail Alliance II), 495 F.3d 695, 711 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 
S. Ct. 1069 (2008). 
194. Id. (characterizing the right in Cruzan as "protecting individual freedom 
from life-saving, but forced, medical treatment"); see also Thomas B. McAffee, Over­
coming Lochner in the Twenty-First Century: Taking Both Rights and Popular Sover­
eignty Seriously as We Seek to Secure Equal Citizenship and Promote the Public Good, 
42 U. RICH. L. REV. 597,617 (2008) (noting that the decision in Cruzan was grounded 
in a longstanding "legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment" (emphasis added) (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725)); Rahul Rajkumar, 
A Human Rights Approach to Routine Provider-Initiated HIV Testing, 7 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICS 319, 348 (2007) (characterizing the decision in Cruzan as 
"a constitutional Substantive Due Process right to make decisions of critical importance 
to one's own destiny" (emphasis added)); Puckett, supra note 26, at 650 (observing that 
Cruzan and Abigail Alliance are both grounded in "the patient's right to make the 
decision about her life free from governmental interference" (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von 
Eschenbach, (Abigail Alliance I), 445 F.3d 470, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en banc, 
495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cere. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008))). 
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Cruzan was seeking, rather than the macro view of why that partic­
ular decision was fundamental. The court, therefore, retreated 
from recognizing the validity of the Alliance's Cruzan argument.195 
As a result, the issue was not viewed through the lens of protecting 
life through personal decisions, but more narrowly as whether there 
was a right to access experimental drugs. 
This characterization denied the Alliance the benefit of 
Cruzan's previously recognized fundamental right. Instead, under 
the approach of the AbigaiL Alliance II court, the right asserted by 
the Alliance would have to stand on its own merits in order to be 
recognized.196 The right in AbigaiL Alliance II should properly have 
focused on the conceptual "why" analysis, and not on the specific 
"how" analysis. By mischaracterizing the asserted right, the en 
banc court substantially impaired the entire analysis-and also 
demonstrated the ease of avoiding many issues under traditional 
fundamental rights analysis. Fundamentally, the Alliance was not 
asserting a right of access to experimental drugs-it was asserting 
the existence of an individual liberty interest in the protection of life 
and, ultimately, the decisions regarding life.197 Not only did Abigail 
Alliance II frame the right too narrowly, it also failed to accurately 
consider the history of drug regulation. 
195. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 711 n.19. 
196. Interestingly, had the en bane court addressed the Alliance's argument 
under the context of Cruzan as it was clarified by the Supreme Court in Glucksberg, the 
Alliance could argue that the type of decision they were seeking would fall squarely 
within the holding of Cruzan, without expanding that holding. In Cruzan, the Court 
held that the decision to refuse treatment, which would lead to the death of the individ­
ual, would be a protected medical decision. Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261. Additionally, Gluck­
sberg's guidepost limited Cruzan by holding that an individual would not have a right to 
cause his own death. Glucksberg,521 U.S. 702. Reading both cases together, it seems 
the Court would recognize a fundamental right to make decisions that will result in 
one's own death, but not decisions made with the express intent to die. The en bane 
court in Abigail Alliance focused on the possibility that experimental drugs could cause 
death (due to limited information on safety and efficacy). Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d 
at 706. However, the intent of the Alliance is not to cause death, but to attempt to 
prevent or delay it. Therefore, the Alliance's argument would not reach as far as the 
petitioner in Glucksberg attempted to take the Cruzan analysis (intent to cause death). 
Rather, the Alliance's argument would only possibly reach to the extent of Cruzan 
(certainty that death would occur). 
197. See LARRY YACKLE, Regulatory Rights: Supreme Court Activism, the Pub­
lic Interest, and the Making of Constitutional Law 99-100 (2007) (explaining that under 
fundamental rights analysis, the right is enforcement of due process, with the real focus 
being the "liberty interest" the plaintiff is trying to protect); see also Abigail Alliance I, 
445 F.3d 470 (defining the right as the protection of life); Puckett, supra note 26 (argu­
ing that the right that would be provided to the terminally ill is a right of self 
preservation ). 
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B. 	 Historical Myths and Questionable Traditions-The En Banc 
Court's Analysis of Drug Regulations 
The "guidepost" of fundamental rights analysis, according to 
the Court in Washington v. Glucksberg, is the examination of his­
tory and tradition, which is used to determine if an asserted right 
has historically been protected by law.198 In Abigail Alliance II, the 
court noted that an omission of government regulation or interfer­
ence throughout history could lend support for a right that is deeply 
rooted. 199 The absence of regulation is viewed cautiously, however, 
because "the absence of positive laws encroaching upon a right 
does not indicate the fundamentality of that right."20o Conversely, 
laws that tend to negate the asserted right do not automatically pre­
clude the existence of a fundamental right.201 If that were the case, 
"governments would be free to violate constitutional norms by per­
sisting in a pattern of unconstitutional enactments."202 Taken to­
gether, these observations lead to the conclusion that historical 
treatment is an ambiguous standard open to numerous methods of 
interpretation.203 
198. 	 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 
U.S. 115, 125 (1992»; see also LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL 
LIBERALISM 198-99 (1996) ("[R)ights and privileges may be presumed to exist, and 
hence less easily erased, if they can be demonstrated to have been part of the 'history 
and traditions of the people.'" (quoting James C. Mohr, Historically Based Legal Briefs: 
Observations ofa Participant in the Webster Process, PUB. HISTORIAN, Summer 1990, at 
19, 20». Analysis shows that the recognition of an asserted right as fundamental does 
not require firm grounding in precedent or statute, but a court must be able to infer that 
protection is warranted based upon history and legal traditions. 
199. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 706 ("[A) lack of government interference 
throughout history might be some evidence that a right is deeply rooted."). But see 
Erwin Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and the First Amendment, 
44 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 901 (1993) ("The Court is often explicit in stating that rights 
should be protected only if there has been a tradition of judicial safeguards ...."). 
200. TRIBE & DORF, supra note 176, at 99; see also Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 
707 ("A prior lack of regulation suggests that we must exercise care in evaluating the 
untested assertion of a constitutional right to be free from new regulation."). 
201. See TRlBE & DORF, supra note 176, at 99. But see Chemerinsky, supra note 
199, at 912 ("[T)he more successful a litigant is in showing widespread, long-term viola­
tions of a right, the less likely the Court will protect it because of society's traditional 
posture concerning it. ... [T)he Court uses the absence of historical protection of a right 
as the basis for refusing current judicial protection."). 
202. 	 TRIBE & DORF, supra note 176, at 99. 
203. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 
127-28 (2001) (noting that historians are often critical when judges use historical analy­
sis because they use facts subjectively as a means to bolster arguments); KALMAN, supra 
note 198, at 196 ("[L)awyers may favor sweeping interpretations [of history) more than 
nitpicking historians."); Chemerinsky, supra note 199, at 913 ("The Court picks and 
chooses from its reading of history and selects those practices that confirm the conclu­
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Despite the ambiguities presented by searching for a historical 
basis on which to ground fundamental rights, the Abigail Alliance II 
court based the crux of its decision on a lack of evidence that the 
asserted right is "deeply rooted in our Nation's history and tradi­
tions.''204 The following sections will examine the court's analysis 
and the fallacy behind its conclusion "that our Nation has long ex­
pressed interest in drug regulation."205 The history of drug regula­
tion, which was outlined in Part I.e., only reflects a series of recent 
developments during the twentieth century. 
1. 	 The Misguided Approach of the Abigail Alliance II 
Court 
Because the en banc court framed the issue as a right of "ac­
cess to experimental drugs," the analysis focused on whether there 
was a history and tradition in this country that allowed "access to 
drugs that have not yet been proven effective" or "safe."206 In the 
eyes of the court, the Alliance needed to demonstrate a history of 
access to unsafe and ineffective drugs, which is clearly an impossi­
sion that it wants to reach."); Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the 
Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349 (1989) (examining 
the ambiguities and shortcomings of historical analysis in interpreting the Constitution); 
William M. Wiecek, Clio as Hostage: The United States Supreme Court and the Uses of 
History, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 227, 267 (1988) (noting that the facts that make up history 
are essentially meaningless without interpretation, which is subjective to the individual 
historian). This ambiguity is evident "because historical traditions can be indetermi­
nate, and because even when we discover a clear historical tradition it is hardly obvious 
what the existence of that tradition tells us about the Constitution's meaning." TRIBE & 
DORF, supra note 176, at 100. But see William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237, 1238-39 (1986) (defending legal "in­
terpretivism" as a method used to interpret the meaning of the Constitution). 
204. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 711; see also TRIBE & DORF, supra note 176, 
at 98-101 (discussing the ambiguities of historical analysis). 
205. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 703. 
206. ld. Although the Abigail Alliance II court relied heavily on safety and effec­
tiveness, it failed to address the limitations of these standards. The FDCA was not 
intended to regulate doctors and pharmacists. Off-label use arises when a doctor 
prescribes an approved medication for a use other than the drug's designated use. 
David G. Adams, The Food and Drug Administration's Regulation of Health Care Pro­
fessionals, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 15, at 423; 
Salbu, supra note 15, at 188. This reality of drug regulation raises important questions 
regarding the Abigail Alliance litigation. In light of the Abigail Alliance II decision, it is 
difficult to reconcile how medications that have been tested and approved for narrow 
uses can be used for other, extraneous uses. See Miller, supra note 15 (noting "that 
terminally ill patients, especially those with cancer, are treated with experimental drugs 
all the time" under off-label uses). Drugs being administered for off-label "uses" have 
not been proven to be safer or more effective for the specific off-label use than a pre­
approved and experimental drug has for any use. 
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ble task.207 Any such argument was doomed to fail because a right 
to access ineffective and unsafe drugs could not have existed before 
drugs were tested and labeled as effective and safe.208 The very 
concept of an "experimental" drug-or an untested drug-did not 
enter the lexicon of drug legislation until the passage of the FDCA. 
Since "experimental" drugs are a relatively recent concept, the 
court should have focused on the history and tradition of relevant 
time periods, which would have demonstrated that there is a histor­
ical basis for accessing "experimental" drugs that is predicated on a 
lack of regulation.209 The historical evidence of drug regulation to 
which the Abigail Alliance II court pointed, however, belies its own 
requirement that the Alliance demonstrate a "tradition of access to 
drugs that have not yet been proven effective, but also ... not yet 
been proven safe. "210 Much of the history and tradition referenced 
in the en banc decision failed to address the court's assertion of a 
longstanding history of drug regulation.211 
The Abigail Alliance II court pointed to regulations aimed at 
the qualifications for pharmacists and doctors, but those regulations 
did not address the safety and efficacy of drugs.212 Indeed, "by the 
1830's almost all the states had statutes requiring examination and 
licensing of physicians ," but there is little evidence of legislation 
207. Experimental drugs, according to the current FDA regulations, are drugs 
that have not yet been approved by the FDA. See 21 U.S.c. § 355 (2000). The FDA 
only approves drugs that have passed the clinical trial process, which requires manufac­
turers to demonstrate the drug's safety and effectiveness. ld. Therefore, a history and 
tradition of access to unsafe and ineffective drugs would demonstrate a tradition of 
access to experimental drugs. 
208. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.c. §§ 301-392) (proof of a drug's effectiveness required after 1962); 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (codi­
fied as amended at 21 U.S.c. §§ 301-392) (proof of a drug's safety required after 1938); 
see also United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552 n.8 (1979) (acknowledging that 
drug effectiveness was not a requirement prior to 1962 and safety was not required 
prior to 1938). 
209. The court in Abigail Alliance 1 certainly believed that this time period sup­
ported the asserted fundamental right. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to De­
velopmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, (Abigail Alliance /), 445 F.3d 470, 472 (D.C. Cir. 
2006), vacated en bane, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 
(2008). Most importantly, a thorough analysis would demonstrate that the FDCA, 
while requiring a demonstration of safety for new drugs, was very limited in controlling 
drug safety prior to the Drug Amendments of 1962. See Federal Food, Drug and Cos­
metic Act of 1938. 
210. Abigail Alliance 11, 495 F.3d at 703. 
211. ld. at 703-07; see supra text accompanying note 104. 
212. Abigail Alliance 11, 495 F.3d at 704. 
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aimed at the safety and efficacy issue.213 The appellate court's con­
clusion that the "Nation has long expressed an interest in drug reg­
ulation" may be accurate, but any resulting legislation did not 
regulate the safety and effectiveness of drugs.214 An "interest in 
drug regulation" is not the same as evidence of drug regulation, 
especially when this "interest" is used to justify the constitutionality 
of regulations that have a dire impact on citizens.215 
In addition to targeting inappropriate historical indicators in its 
analysis, the Abigail Alliance II court also required a showing of a 
specific historical basis for access to experimental drugs.216 The 
court viewed any regulation of drugs as a dispositive indicator that 
there was no right of access to experimental drugs.217 However, 
this treatment overreaches the purpose of turning to historical anal­
ysis. History serves as a "guidepost" to fundamental rights analy­
sis-not as a hurdle that must first be passed.218 Requiring an 
affirmative showing that a right has been historically protected pre­
supposes that prior generations would recognize any and all funda­
mental rights that contemporary generations would recognize. This 
approach, however, could not realistically confront numerous issues 
that arise due to technological advances, especially in the area of 
medicine. 
2. 	 The Supreme Court's Recognition of Safety and 
Effectiveness in Drug Regulation Focuses on the 
Past Sixty Years. 
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the area of drug safety 
further evidences the proper historical analysis of major federal 
213. KREMERS, URDANG & SONNEDECKER, supra note 104, at 180 (emphasis 
added). These "new drugs" were considered "experimental" until the limited safety 
requirements of the 1938 Act were met. 
214. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 703. Furthermore, it has been observed that 
prior to the FDCA, "consumers could simply buy any nonnarcotic drug they desired," 
which undermines the appellate court's conclusion concerning drug regulation. TEMIN, 
supra note 116, at 47; see also supra text accompanying notes 104 and 129 (providing 
further analysis of the en banc court's asserted "history"). 
215. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 703. 
216. The court in Abigail Alliance II stated: 
[T]o succeed on its claim of a fundamental right of access for the terminally ill 
to experimental drugs, the Alliance must show not only that there is a tradition 
of access to drugs that have not yet been proven effective, but also a tradition 
of access to drugs that have not yet been proven safe. 
[d. (emphasis added). 
217. [d. 
218. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). 
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drug regulation that Abigail Alliance II should have focused on.219 
In United States v. Johnson, the Court concluded that effectiveness 
was not required by the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906.220 Ac­
cording to the Court, "misleading statements" concerning the 
claimed effects of a drug were not considered a misbranding under 
the Act.221 If misleading claims regarding the effectiveness of drugs 
were not subject to the provisions of the Pure Food and Drugs Act, 
it was because the Act was silent on effectiveness and did not in­
tend to regulate the effectiveness of drugs. 
Later, in Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., the 
Supreme Court observed that regulation of drug safety and efficacy 
began with the FDCA and the 1962 drug amendments.222 In Wein­
berger, the Court examined whether studies for the drug Lutrexin 
were sufficient to satisfy the effectiveness requirements needed for 
the continued approval of a new drug application.223 The Court ac­
knowledged that prior to 1938 there were no regulations preventing 
a manufacturer of a new drug from introducing the drug into the 
219. See supra Part I.e. 
220. United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488,495 (1911). In Johnson, a drug man­
ufacturer included a claim on the label of the drug "that the contents were effective in 
curing cancer," which the government argued was misbranding under the Act because 
the claimed effectiveness could not be substantiated. Id. The Court concluded that the 
language of the act was not intended to cover "all possible false statements." Id. at 497. 
According to the Court's interpretation, Congress "was much more likely to regulate 
commerce in food and drugs with reference to plain matter of fact ... than to distort the 
uses of its constitutional power to establishing criteria in regions where opinions are far 
apart." Id. at 498. In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Holmes implied that 
the "claims were stated to be opinions, which were not capable of being proven right or 
wrong" and thus were "protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of 
speech." TEMIN, supra note 116, at 33. 
221. Johnson, 221 U.S. at 496. 
222. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973). 
223. /d. at 615-16. The New Drug Application (NDA) requirement under the 
original act was a much more liberal requirement than it is under its current form: 
This NDA was to include "full reports of investigations which have been made 
to show whether or not such a drug is safe for use." If the submitted 
paperwork was satisfactory, the application was allowed to become effective. 
Between 1938 and 1962 about 13,000 NDAs were submitted and about 70 per­
cent were allowed to be marketed. 
RAY & KSIR, supra note 147, at 62. The NDA requirement under the original act 
served more as a rubber stamp for drug companies than as a protection for the general 
public. See Joel E. Hoffman, Administrative Procedures o/the Food and Drug Adminis­
tration, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 15, at 43 (noting 
that Weinberger dealt primarily with "applying the effectiveness requirements of the 
1962 Drug Amendments to previously approved prescription drugs" as a basis for re­
moving FDA approval for pre-approved drugs). 
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marketplace.224 Additionally, the FDCA "provided for regulatory 
clearance of drugs prior to marketing ... in the interests of public 
safety,"225 and that "the 1938 Act permitted evaluation of a new 
drug solely on the grounds of its safety."226 It was not until the 1962 
drug amendments that the FDA had the authority to "evaluate 
drugs for effectiveness as well as safety."227 At this point, the FDA 
became a "gatekeeper" to market access of new drugs.228 
The Abigail Alliance II court asserted that the Alliance's argu­
ment concerning the effectiveness of drugs failed because, "as a 
matter of history, at least some drug regulation prior to 1962 ad­
dressed efficacy" and "an arguably limited history of efficacy regu­
lation prior to 1962 does not establish a fundamental right of access 
to unproven drugs."229 The court, however, provided no examples 
of regulations concerning the effectiveness of drugs in support of 
this assertion, and only acknowledged "that Congress and the FDA 
have continually responded to new risks," and that "[r]ecent gov­
ernment efficacy regulation has reflected Congress's exercise of its 
well-established power to regulate ...."230 The court also failed to 
take into consideration the efforts made to ease the effect of the 
hurdles placed on access to unapproved drugS.231 
224. Weinberger, 412 U.S. at 623; supra notes 119-129 and accompanying text. 
225. Weinberger, 412 U.S. at 623; see also RAY & KSIR, supra note 147, at 62 ("A 
critical change in the 1938 law was the requirement that before a new drug could be 
marketed its manufacturer must test it for toxicity. "). 
226. Weinberger, 412 U.S. at 615 (emphasis added). But see Janssen, supra note 
119, at 438 (arguing that effectiveness requirements had been around since the Massa­
chusetts Bay Colony in 1630). 
227. Weinberger, 412 U.S. at 630 (emphasis added); see also RAY & KSIR, supra 
note 147, at 63 ("The most important change was one requiring that every new drug be 
demonstrated to be effective for the illnesses mentioned on the label."); U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration, Milestones in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, http://www.fda. 
gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) ("Kefauver-Harris 
Drug Amendments passed to ensure drug efficacy and greater drug safety. For the first 
time, drug manufacturers are required to prove to FDA the effectiveness of their products 
...." (emphasis added». But see Note, Drug Efficacy, supra note 121, at 186 (noting 
that "the Food and Drug Act of 1906 was amended in 1912 to declare drugs making 
fraudulent claims of efficacy to be misbranded" in response to the Supreme Court deci­
sion in United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 498 (1911». 
228. RAY & KSIR, supra note 147, at 62. 
229. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es­
chenbach (Abigail Alliance II), 495 F.3d 695, 706 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. de­
nied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). 
230. !d. 
231. See supra notes 161-165 and accompanying text (discussing the 1988 Drug 
Amendments); see also Greenberg, supra note 161, at 334 ("The FDA's new drug ap­
proval regime ... [is] focused on making experimental drugs available more rapidly, 
both on a pre-approval and post-approval basis."). 
576 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:535 
Johnson, Weinberger, and Rutherford may not support the Alli­
ance's argument, but these cases certainly dilute the rationale of the 
en banc court's decision.232 The court's analysis of history and tra­
dition ignored many key factors necessary for a comprehensive 
analysis of the right at issue. If the en banc court had approached 
the analysis more thoroughly, it would have discovered a void in 
regulations during the first half of our nation's existence. That pe­
riod was followed by the gradual tightening of control, which led to 
litigation over access to various drugs.233 
C. 	 The Right Asserted Falls Under the Umbrella of Cruzan and 
Should Be Recognized as Fundamental 
The Abigail Alliance, as well as the initial appeals court deci­
sion, characterized the asserted right as analogous to the fundamen­
tal right recognized in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of 
Health. 234 The Abigail Alliance I court concluded that the liberty 
precedent of the Supreme Court "indicates that the right claimed 
by the Alliance can be inferred from the Court's conclusion in 
Cruzan . .. that an individual has a due process right to refuse life­
sustaining medical treatment."235 If individuals have the right to 
make decisions and take risks that would clearly lead to their 
deaths, then they also have the right to make decisions and assume 
risks that might lead to their deaths. 
The Cruzan Court stated that "[t]he choice between life and 
death is a deeply personal decision of obvious and overwhelming 
finality," which allowed the state to impose requirements to protect 
that choice.236 In supporting this decision, the Court determined 
that a state can require elevated evidentiary requirements of the 
intent of the patient as a means to protect the "personal element" 
232. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552 (1979) (recognizing that 
the 1962 Drug Amendments first established requirements for drug effectiveness and 
the FDCA of 1938 first required evidence of safety);. Weinberger, 412 U.S. at 612-14 
(noting that drug regulations did not begin examinations for safety prior to 1938 and 
effectiveness prior to 1962); Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (arguing that the Pure Food and 
Drugs Act of 1906 did not require that a drug be effective). 
233. 	 See discussion supra Part I.B-C. 
234. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); see supra note 86 
for a discussion of the fundamental right at issue in Cruzan. 
235. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es­
chenbach, (Abigail Alliance I), 445 F.3d 470, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en banc 495 
F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). 
236. 	 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281 (emphasis added). 
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of the choice.237 In recognizing that "the choice between life and 
death" is "deeply personal," the Court set these types of decisions 
apart as ones that should be left up to the individual.238 
To support its holding, the Court in Cruzan noted that an in­
trusion into one's body without consent is an assault, which creates 
liability in the perpetrator.239 The requirement of informed con­
sent, which is a basic fixture in American law, leads to "[t]he logical 
corollary ... that the patient generally possesses the right not to 
consent."240 Simply put, if a doctor is required to obtain a patient's 
informed consent prior to administering treatment, the patient is 
equally free to withhold consent. It is the consent of the patient 
that is the dispositive factor regarding treatment. The bodily integ­
rity doctrine was recognized by the Cruzan Court as a longstanding 
principle that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully 
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to 
the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint 
or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable au­
thority of law."241 The right the Alliance argued for rises to the 
level of that described by the Court in Cruzan and should likewise 
be recognized.242 
The Alliance sought a decision that is remarkably analogous to 
Cruzan-there are only a few minor conceptual differences. The 
first conceptual difference, and the most limiting to the Alliance's 
case, is the foundation on which the Cruzan case was based. The 
Cruzan Court pointed to a common law right to bodily integrity, 
which includes a requirement of a patient's informed consent.243 
The Alliance lacks an analogous common law right according to the 
appellate court.244 A second difference is the type of government 
237. [d. Ironically, instead of allowing the government to take measures to pre­
serve a terminally ill patient's decision, which was the concern of the Court in Cruzan, 
the court in Abigail Alliance 1/ allowed the government to prevent the patient's right to 
make such a decision. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. 
von Eschenbach (Abigail Alliance 1/), 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). 
238. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281. 
239. [d. at 269. 
240. [d. at 270. 
241. [d. at 269 (alteration in original) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). 
242. See id. 
243. [d. 
244. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es­
chenbach (Abigail Alliance 1/), 495 FJd 695, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. de­
nied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). The Alliance argued that the common law doctrine of 
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action at issue. Under Cruzan, the government would be standing 
aside while the terminally ill patient refused treatment, while Abi­
gail Alliance would require the government to stand aside while the 
terminally ill patient received treatment from a willing drug 
manufacturer. 
Additionally, there is another minor, but notable difference be­
tween the Alliance's asserted right and the right delineated by the 
Supreme Court in Cruzan. In Cruzan, the right permitted would 
allow an individual to dictate his own treatment and make a deci­
sion that would result in death.245 The Alliance is seeking treat­
ment that could result in death. The premise of Cruzan is that an 
individual can refuse viable treatments while the Alliance seeks the 
ability to obtain further treatment when all viable treatments are 
extinguished. Cruzan permits an individual to dictate the measures 
that may be taken to sustain his life. Abigail Alliance II limits those 
measures if they are based on experimental medications. 
This is an inconsistent result. If Cruzan allows an individual to 
refuse treatments that sustain life, thereby choosing death, then an 
individual should also be permitted to seek treatments that may 
sustain life. Since "[t]he choice between life and death is a deeply 
personal decision of obvious and overwhelming finality," the indi­
vidual should be permitted to choose how to face death-either re­
solved to the "finality," or by pursuing all potentially lifesaving 
actions.246 The FDA should be concerned with the safety and effi­
cacy of drugs, but not act as a barrier to treatments that could pro­
duce positive results for an individual whose death is certain 
without such treatment. 
Cruzan ultimately stands for allowing a competent person -to 
make an informed decision that she understands will lead ulti­
mately to her death.247 The decision in Abigail Alliance II limits 
the choices for a terminally ill individual to FDA-approved medica­
tions. The en banc court has determined that a decision can only be 
informed if the FDA determines that the drugs sought are safe and 
effective.248 A decision based on the best available information is 
necessity, the tort of intentional interference with rescue, and the right to self-defense 
lead, conceptually, to a right of self-preservation, which has its roots in the common 
law. The en banc court, however, dismissed these common law duties as failing to pro­
vide support for a fundamental right to access experimental medication. Id. at 707-10. 
245. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 28I. 
246. Id. 
247. See id.; supra text accompanying note 196. 
248. See Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 703. The court in Abigail Alliance /I 
arrived at the conclusion that terminally ill patients do not have a fundamental right to 
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not sufficient to meet the requirements of the en banc court. In 
essence, the court added another requirement-the decision must 
be informed and FDA-approved. 
The Abigail Alliance II court acknowledged that the purpose 
of Phase I of the clinical trial process is designed in large part to 
"gather[] data on effectiveness" and that the "primary focus is to 
determine whether the drug is safe enough for continued human 
testing."249 The court deferred to the judgment of the FDA con­
cerning what level of risk the individual patient should be willing to 
accept with an end-of-life decision. The premise of Cruzan logi­
cally leads to the ability of a terminally ill patient, with no other 
viable treatment option, to make a decision based on the informa­
tion available to him at the time the decision is made. 
CONCLUSION 
The FDA regulations governing the availability of experimen­
tal drugs achieve important state purposes. They ensure safety and 
efficacy and hold manufacturers accountable for the drugs they pro­
duce. Indeed, it is these important purposes that fuel opposition to 
the type of access that the Alliance is attempting to gain.250 These 
regulations, however, impose burdens on terminally ill people 
whose lives literally depend on access to new medications that 
could prove to be lifesaving. The initial appellate decision, Abigail 
Alliance I, found, through sound reasoning, "that an individual 
must ... be free to decide for herself whether to assume any known 
or unknown risks of taking a medication that might prolong her 
life. "251 This is especially important for terminally ill patients, 
whose circumstances drastically alter the balance between the po­
tential benefits and the detriments of that treatment. 
It is true that experimental medications will not always result 
in a benefit to a terminally ill patient. Yet, experimental treatments 
have worked miracles. Take, for example, the recent story of pro­
fessional football player Kevin Everett. On September 9, 2007, Ke­
vin made a tackle during a game and suffered a "fracture 
the access of experimental drugs because those drugs have not been proven safe or 
effective for their intended purpose. [d. 
249. [d. at 698 (citing Phases of an Investigation, 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a)(1) (2008)). 
250. Foreman, supra note 8 (noting that providing access to experimental drugs 
would undermine the system of ensuring drug safety and efficacy). 
251. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es­
chenbach, (Abigail Alliance I), 445 F.3d 470, 484 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en bane, 495 
F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). 
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dislocation of [his] cervical vertebrae"-an injury that usually re­
sults in paralysis.252 Kevin was treated with controversial and 
ground breaking medical care, which may have played a significant 
role in his ability to walk again.253 The treatment he received has 
not been proven safe, and its effectiveness is not certain because of 
the additional care he received for his injury. Equally unknown, of 
course, is what condition he would be in today if the experimental 
treatment had not been provided. 
The choice by a terminally ill individual to undergo treatment 
using currently unproven medications is no different from other 
medical choices protected as fundamental rights-and the risks are 
often the same. By denying terminally ill individuals the right to 
access potentially lifesaving medications, the government is making 
the individual's choice for her, rather than giving her the freedom 
to make her own choice. Instead of recognizing that a person has a 
right to fend off death by trying every possible cure, the FDA regu­
lations remove options that would give hope to those who need it 
most. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what risks would outweigh 
any potential benefits when the only other alternative is death. Re­
gardless, the decision to accept these risks should be vested in the 
individual and not the government. 
Matthew R. Madara 
252. Tim Layden, Kevin Everett: The Road Back, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 17, 
2007, at 57, 58, 62. 
253. Id. at 58. 
